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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, law and economics scholars have
mounted a largely successful hostile takeover of the corporate legal
academy. Although both traditionalists and leftists have fought sepa-
rate rear-guard actions against the law and economics movement for
many years, the principal resistance is currently offered by a group of
relatively young academics loosely centered around the corporate law
faculties of the Washington & Lee and George Washington law
schools. George Washington University law professor Lawrence
Mitchell has brought together ten of the most prominent of these
scholars in a new volume that provides a useful introduction to the
genre.'
Reviewing a collection of essays is never an easy task, but the task
here is made especially complex by the remarkable diversity among
Progressive Corporate Law's contributing authors. These scholars are far
more firmly united by what they oppose-Chicago-style law and eco-
nomics-than by what they support.2 Nonetheless, at least some of
Progressive Corporate Law's authors are groping towards a common set
of ideas, albeit one that is perhaps more accurately labelled as "com-
munitarian" than "progressive." This Essay, therefore, does not pur-
port to offer a comprehensive review of Progressive Corporate Law or any
specific article therein, but rather uses some of those articles as a
jumping-off point for an extended critique of progressive communi-
tarian theories of corporate law.
I have been privileged to participate in both formal and informal
conversations with some of the nation's best progressive corporate law
scholars. 4 Although most corporate law scholars, including most in
1 PROGRESSIVE CoRPoRATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). I am loath to con-
cede the term "progressive" to Professor Mitchell, given my perception that it is simply a
code word used by the political left to take advantage of the positive connotations most
Americans associate with the idea of progress. Cf David Horowitz, Socialism Never Dies,
WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 1, 1996, at 37 (noting "the arrogant historicism of the Left, which is
convinced that its agendas are 'progressive' and that its progress is the destiny of man-
kind"). I nevertheless use it herein, both out of deference to Professor Mitchell's choice of
terminology and for lack of a better term.
2 Virtually all of the essays in Progressive Corporate Law take a negative view of law and
economics, with the notable exception of Eric Orts's insightful article on multinational
corporations. See generally Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations, in PRO-
GRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at 247, 253-55. I do not otherwise address Orts's
excellent essay, because he deals with a sui generis set of issues.
3 See infra Part HI.
4 See, e.g., Symposium, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. RE%,. 1373
(1993).
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the law and economics camp, purport to embrace an apolitical objec-
tivity, my disagreement with progressive corporate law scholars is ex-
plicitly political. This Essay continues and refines our on-going
dialogue by candidly articulating a conservative version of the law and
economics account of corporate law.5
Although the debate between conservative contractarianism and
progressive communitarianism ultimately takes place mainly on the
plane of moral philosophy and political theory, much of the progres-
sive critique of contractarianism claims to sound in economic theory.
Many of Progressive Corporate Law's authors deny contractarianism's va-
lidity and/or its utility as an economic model. The first two Parts of
this Essay, therefore, are devoted to evaluating the economic argu-
ments regarding contractarianism. Part I of this Essay critiques the
progressive attack on the prevailing law and economics theory of the
firm. Part II does likewise to the progressive attack on the rational
choice model underlying mainstream law and economics. Because
the arguments on both sides are well-developed in the literature, these
Parts focus on analyzing the specific spin Progressive Corporate Law's
authors give the debate. In Part III, the heart of the essay, I explore
the communitarian alternative to the law and economics theory of the
firm and propose a conservative variant on the basic contractarian
model.
I
THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS THEORY OF THE FIRM
The law and economics movement remains the most successful
example of intellectual arbitrage in the history of corporate jurispru-
dence. It is virtually impossible to find serious corporate law scholar-
ship that is not informed by economic analysis. Even those corporate
law scholars who reject economic analysis spend most of their time
responding to those of us who practice it, as Progressive Corporate Law
itself abundantly illustrates. Perhaps the most telling evidence of the
success of law and economics in our field, however, is that many lead-
ing corporate lawjudges and lawyers now rely upon economic analysis
extensively. Both judicial opinions and practitioner publications are
5 Calling oneself a conservative contractarian is not a redundancy, despite what some
of Progressive Corporate Law's authors seem to believe. Most practitioners of law and eco-
nomics embrace a world view more closely akin to nineteenth century liberalism than to
the Burkean conservatism followed by those to whom I refer as "conservative contractari-
ans." I therefore use the term "conservative contractarian" to identify scholars who gloss
accepted economic theories of the firm with the principles of Tory conservatism. See infra
notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 82:856
COMMUNITY AND STATISM
filled with the jargon of law and economics. This is a claim no other
modem school of jurisprudence can make.6
Progressive Corporate Law's contributing authors, if pressed hard
enough, would most likely not deny the relevance of economic princi-
ples to the study of corporate law. To the contrary, many of them
make explicit use of selected economic tools. It is thus not economics
per se to which they object, but rather to the specific economic mod-
els of firms and human behavior embraced by the law and economics
school of corporate law and, sub silentio, to the unwillingness of those
in the mainstream of law and economics to acknowledge those writing
outside the prevailing paradigm.
Most law and economics scholars embrace a model of business
organizations known as the "nexus-of-contracts theory of the firm."7
These so-called "contractarians" model the firm not as a single entity,
but as an aggregate of various inputs acting together with the com-
mon goal of producing goods or services. Employees provide labor.
Creditors provide debt capital. Shareholders provide equity capital,
bear the risk of losses, and monitor the performance of management.
Management monitors the performance of employees and coordi-
nates the activities of all the firm's inputs. The firm is simply a legal
fiction representing the complex set of contractual relationships be-
tween these inputs. In other words, the firm is not an individual
thing, but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts es-
tablishing rights and obligations among the various inputs making up
the firm.
As a matter of intellectual interest, the debate over the contrac-
tual nature of the firm is over. As Delaware Chancellor William Allen
opines, the contractarian model is now the "dominant legal academic
6 Douglas Branson rejects the notion that contractarianism is the dominant mode of
thinking in modem corporate law. Instead, according to Branson, the nexus-of-contracts
theory is "returning to its proper place as [a] useful analysis for some purposes." Douglas
M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the Vindication of Structure and Authority in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Law, in PRoGRESsIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at 93,
94. To paraphrase Mark Twain, Branson's report of contractarianism's demise is greatly
exaggerated. Indeed, Branson's views are contradicted by his fellow essayists. See, e.g.,
Gregory A. Mark, Some Observations on Writing the Legal Histoy of the Corporation in the Age of
Theory, in PROGRESSVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at 67, 72 (asserting that the nexus-of-
contracts theory is the "dominant [voice] in current corporate law literature"); Joel Selig-
man, Foreword to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1, at ix (acknowledging the dom-
inance of law and economics). The dominance of the economic paradigm in modem
corporatejurisprudence is likewise recognized by no less an authority than Delaware Chan-
cellor William Allen. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1395, 1399 (1993).
7 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18J. CoRP. L. 301, 318-28
(1993). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989) (analyzing the various roles played by investors, managers,
and others in the corporate setting).
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view."8 This is not to say that the contractarian view has pre-empted
the field, as Progressive Corporate Law itself demonstrates, but only that
the debate is fully played out. Contractarians and noncontractarians
no longer have much of interest to say to one another; indeed, they
barely speak the same language. To shift metaphors, those who ad-
here to the nexus of contracts model pass those who do not like so
many ships in the night, with only an occasional exchange of broad-
sides to enliven the proceedings.
If I may extend the maritime metaphor, the various essays com-
prising Progressive Corporate Law amount to one long, rolling broadside
against the contractarian vessel. The remainder of this Part evaluates
their marksmanship on several fronts. The first two are fairly minor:
(1) the claim that the nexus of contracts model is not an accurate
description of corporate law, and (2) the claim that contractarianism
is little more than apologetics for corporate managers. The third pro-
gressive critique is somewhat more serious and is, therefore, the prin-
cipal focus of this Part: almost all of Progressive Corporate Law's
contributing authors regard contractarianism as an incomplete de-
scription of economic reality. This assertion is true but, upon close
examination, scarcely passes the "so what?" test.
A. The Mandatory Rules' Red Herring
The nexus of contracts model has important implications for a
range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of which is the debate
over the proper role of mandatory legal rules. Contractarians con-
tend that corporate law is generally comprised of default rules, from
which shareholders are free to depart, rather than mandatory rules.
As a normative matter, contractarians argue that this is just as it
should be.9
In Progressive Corporate Law, Douglas Branson rejects this con-
tractarian view and argues instead that mandatory rules pervade cor-
porate law.10 This attack is far from fatal. In the first instance, most
contractarians probably regard the theory's normative claim as being
the more important of the two. As such, we cheerfully concede the
existence of mandatory rules, while deploring that unfortunate fact.
In the second, as Bernard Black persuasively argues, many mandatory
corporate law rules are trivial in nature." Finally, nontrivial
8 Allen, supra note 6, at 1400.
9 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUGrURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the AL Code, 61 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 984, 989-91 (1993).
10 See Branson, supra note 6, at 94-95.
11 Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Tyivial: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 542 passim (1990). The triviality argument provides a partial response to Wil-
liam Bratton's observation that most contractarian scholars do not propose a sweeping
[Vol. 82:856
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mandatory rules are often subject to evasion by choice of form and
jurisdiction.12 Thus, the progressives' focus on mandatory legal rules
is little more than a red herring.
B. Contractarianism as Apologetics
In Progressive Corporate Law's most vociferous essay, Douglas Bran-
son charges that contractarianism amounts to little more than paid
apologetics for "the wishes and desires of the titans of corporate
America."' 3 Granted, much of contractarian scholarship is devoted to
defense of the status quo. In contrast, "[i] t is a characteristic-of 'tradi-
tional legal scholarship' generally, and corporate legal scholarship in
particular, that.., a question... [is] worth exploring only insofar as
the analysis and solution of the problem lead necessarily to a proposal
for doctrinal reform .... ,,14 Conservative contractarians recognize,
however, that "change may not be salutary reform: hasty innovation
may be a devouring conflagration, rather than a torch of progress."' 5
Defense of the status quo provides a necessary check on reformists'
zeal.
The preceding paragraph took a quotation from Jason Scott
Johnston somewhat out of context, which is perhaps justifiable on
grounds that it so aptly captured the point I was trying to make. In
repeal of mandatory fiduciary duties. Bratton attributes this failure to "doubts about both
contractarian assumptions and their underlying ethical presuppositions." William W. Brat-
ton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSlVE
CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1, at 139, 152. Yet, the contractarian position on mandatory
fiduciary duties may simply indicate a belief that such rules are subject to evasion through
choice of form or, to the extent that some duties appear across the spectrum of possible
organizational forms, that they are trivial in the sense that they embody rules virtually eve-
ryone would demand in the event of actual bargaining.
Conservative contractarians might tolerate mandatory fiduciary duties even if Bratton
could demonstrate that such duties are non-trivial. For the conservative contractarian,
Tory principles can trump economic analysis. Among such principles is the bedrock no-
tion that "[clustom, convention, and old prescription are checks both upon man's anar-
chic impulse and upon the innovator's lust for power." RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE
MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 9 (7th rev. ed. 1995). Of course, adherence to this Tory
principle is often consistent with economic analysis. In fact, one might recast the Tory
appreciation of custom in economic terms by describing it as an instinctive respect for the
power of path dependence.
Conservative contractarians thus are loath to try unwinding a century or more of com-
mon-law development. In turn, Bratton is correct to acknowledge that "an everyday con-
servatism" is reflected in the alleged contractarian failure to advocate a more expansive
reform program. Bratton, supra, at 152.
12 See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1019.
13 Branson, supra note 6, at 93. In her recent review of Progressive Corporate Law,
Deborah DeMott, likewise noted the charge that contractarianism's "net import is to legiti-
mate the current range of management power and discretion." Deborah A. DeMott, Trust
and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1308, 1331 (1996).
14 Jason ScottJohnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of Corporate
Law, 18J. CORP. L. 213, 221 (1993).
15 KIR, supra note 11, at 9.
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context, Johnston's remark makes another point applicable to the
present discussion. The 1932 publication of Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means' book The Modern Corporation and Private Property began the
modem era of corporate governance scholarship. 16 Berle and Means
demonstrated that public corporations were characterized by a separa-
tion of ownership and control: the firm's nominal owners, the share-
holders, exercised virtually no control over either day-to-day
operations or long-term policy. Instead, control was vested in the
hands of professional managers, who typically owned only a small por-
tion of the firm's shares. Separation of ownership and control devel-
oped, according to Berle and Means, because stock ownership
became dispersed among many shareholders, no one of whom owned
enough shares to materially affect the corporation's management.
Scholars writing in the Berle-Means tradition often commit the
fallacy of treating the separation of ownership and control as a prob-
lematic feature of public corporations. 17 As a result, they devote their
energies to seeking doctrinal solutions to this perceived failing of cor-
porate governance. In contrast, contractarianism offers a metaphor
in which the separation of ownership and control is not a problem,
but rather simply a necessary, and arguably unremarkable, attribute of
the modem public corporation.' 8 As a result, contractarian corporate
law scholars can focus on endeavors such as understanding why cer-
tain corporate governance devices evolved as they did, rather than on
trying to cobble together yet another doctrinal solution to the separa-
tion of ownership and control. 19 Contrary to Branson's view,20 this is
not mere apologetics, but rather an effort to understand the "is"
before plunging headfirst into the "ought."
C. The Incompleteness of Contractarianism
Most of Progressive Corporate Law's authors contend that the con-
tractarian model is an incomplete theory of interpersonal relation-
16 ADOLFA. BERLEJR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
17 "Agency costs" is the modem terminology, but Berle and Means identified the ba-
sic problem over forty years before that term was invented. "The separation of ownership
from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager
may, and often do, diverge...." Id. at 6. Preventing such divergences, or at least minimiz-
ing their effects, has been the primary concern of post-Berle and Means scholarship. The
obligatory modem citation is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theoy of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Stncture, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 328-80 (1976).
18 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 671, 671-78 (1995) (reviewing MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OwNERs: THE
POLITIcAL ROOTS OF AamFicAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)).
19 In other words, the contractarian model permits an approach to corporate law
scholarship that focuses on the use of economic models to explain why existing patterns of
corporate law and governance came into being. See, e.g.,Johnston, supra note 14, at 232-35.
20 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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ships within a firm.2' If contractarianism claimed to be a depiction of
economic reality, this argument might have some traction. In my
view, however, contractarianism claims only to offer a richer metaphor
than do traditional entity-based theories and, as such, a more useful
heuristic for understanding corporations. 22 The progressive critique
of contractarianism thus fails at the starting gate.
The progressive critique becomes even less persuasive when one
examines its specific charges. In order to evaluate the progressives'
line of argument, we must make some fine distinctions: first, the dis-
tinction between the default rules provided by corporate statutes and
organic rules adopted by specific corporations in their articles, bylaws,
and employment policies; second, between actual and hypothetical
bargains, as well as process and outcome bargaining. The latter set of
distinctions is the main reason progressives and contractarians pass
one another like ships in the night; in each pair, progressives focus on
the former issue, while contractarians focus on the latter.
21 See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPO-
RAXE LAW, supra note 1, at 35, 48; David Millon, Communitarianim in Corporate Law: Founda-
tions and Law Reform Strategis, in PROGRESSnE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1, at 1, 5;
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Preface to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at xiii, xiv-xv.
In her review of Progressive Corporate Law, Deborah DeMott takes a similar position. De-
Mott, supra note 13, at 1331-32. Indeed, Bratton goes as far as to deny the very validity of
the contractual metaphor: "This business of coming up with [a] crude efficiency structure
by staring at one's navel and then calling it a contract signed onto by real world parties has
got to stop." Letter from William Bratton, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, to Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law (Apr. 8, 1996)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Bratton's April 8th letter].
22 As such, contractarianism has important implications for the way in which we think
about intra-corporate relationships. Consider, for example, David Millon's contention that
contractarian theory "rests on an underlying commitment to the sanctity of shareholder
property rights." Millon, supra note 21, at 4. Millon's critique implicates the traditional
reification of the corporation-treating the corporation as an entity or, more precisely, as
a thing capable of being owned, separate from its various constituents. Id. at 2 (accusing
contractarians of dismissing out of hand "the idea of the corporation as a real entity-a
distinctive 'thing' having an existence separate from its component parts"). However, Mil-
lon elsewhere concedes the fictional nature of corporate personhood. David Millon, Per-
sonjfing the Corporate Body, 2 GRAVEN IMAGES 116, 116-17 (1995) [hereinafter Millon,
Personifying the Corporate Body]. Millon's disagreement with contractarians thus is not so
much about the entity status of the corporation, as it is about the extent to which the
corporation should be described in non-contractual terms.
In any case, nexus-of-contracts theory rejects traditional entity-based theories. Be-
cause shareholders are simply one of the inputs bound together by the web of voluntary
agreements, ownership should not be a particularly meaningful concept in nexus-of-con-
tracts theory. Someone owns each input, but no one owns the totality. Instead, the corpo-
ration is an aggregation of people bound together by a complex web of contractual
relationships. The contractarian account thus rests not on an out-moded reification of the
corporation, but on the presumption of validity a free market society accords voluntary
contracts.
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1. Default Rules and Hypothetical Bargains
As noted above, contractarians contend that corporate law con-
sists mainly of default rules. Put another way, in the nexus-of-con-
tracts model, corporate statutes and decisions amount to a standard-
form contract voluntarily adopted-perhaps with modifications-by
the corporation's various constituencies. William Bratton's essay of-
fers the most fully developed critique of this contractarian story in
Progressive Corporate Law. At the core of Bratton's thesis is a game the-
ory-based argument that contractarianism fails to account for defects
in the bargaining process.23 Bratton contends that reciprocal eco-
nomic relations of the sort found within a corporation differ from
arm's-length bargains, because groups must develop loyalty, trust, and
good will in order to succeed.2 4 Bratton further argues that because
good will is fragile in nature, corporate law should, and does, strive to
promote intragroup trust "by imposing a norm of honor on those in
authority."25 This ideal of honorable behavior drives Bratton's attack
on contractarianism. Bratton opines that contractarians ignore the
trust-promoting function of corporate law, because "rational [eco-
nomic] actors do not bring norms of honor to the ordering of their
affairs." 26 According to Bratton, contractarians recognize "only one
motivation-conscious self-interest. '27 Furthermore, among con-
tractarians, "It]here survives no separate impulse to protect trust
reposed."28
At least insofar as conservative contractarians are concerned,
Bratton's allegations overstate the case. It is not the importance of
trust and honor with which I quibble, but rather the means by which
Bratton and his colleagues propose to promote those virtues.29 Yet,
even assuming the charge to be well-taken, arguendo, I remain
unpersuaded.
23 Bratton, supra note 11, at 153.
24 Id. at 145.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 141.
27 Id. at 151.
28 Id. at 152.
29 See infra Part III.B. Bratton's position looks at first blush to be quite Burkean. He
not only advocates a return to the early traditions of corporate law, but expresses concern
for ideals, like honor and duty, to which conservatives traditionally lay claim. As I argue
below in more detail, however, Bratton's argument is too statist for a conservative's tastes.
See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. To be sure, Bratton suggests using extant
commercial norms to define the scope of honorable conduct, which somewhat minimizes
the statist implications of his approach. Unfortunately, this move suffers from two flaws.
First, Bratton's own game-theory analysis implies that commercial norms are essentially
indeterminate. Bratton, supra note 11, at 154-56. Second, there remains the risk that the
state could declare existing corporate practice unacceptable as Judge Hand famously did
in The T.j Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Consider Bratton's contention that the nexus-of-contracts model
"has a significant shortcoming" in that it "gives us ex ante contracts
across-the-board and thereby makes corporate governance entirely
contractual without providing a description of the process by which
corporate actors make contracts. '3 0 Here we confront the distinction
between actual and hypothetical bargaining. Contractarians concede,
or at least should concede, that actual bargaining over rules such as
limited liability is precluded by transaction cost barriers, but they con-
tend that this is precisely why corporate statutes provide a set of off-
the-rack rules amounting to a standard-form contract.31
If transaction costs are zero, the substantive content of a corpo-
rate law rule does not matter greatly.3 2 If, for example, the law im-
posed full personal liability on shareholders, but limited liability is the
efficient rule, shareholders and creditors would contract around the
rule through private bargaining. In the face of transaction costs, how-
ever, the rule's substantive content begins to matter very much. In-
deed, if transaction costs are high, bargaining around the rule
becomes wholly impractical, forcing the parties to live with an ineffi-
cient rule. Because the public corporation setting gives rise to prohib-
itively high transaction costs, parties cannot depend on private
contracting to achieve efficient outcomes. Instead, a legally-imposed
rule must function as a substitute for private bargaining. Identifying
the party for whom getting one's way has the highest value thus be-
comes the critical question. In effect, corporate legal scholars ask:
"'If the parties could costlessly bargain over the question, which rule
would they adopt?"' 33 By imposing a rule to which parties would
agree if they could bargain, society facilitates private ordering.
30 Bratton, supra note 11, at 154.
31 David Millon criticizes the nexus-of-contracts model on the ground that the bar-
gaining takes place against a background of entitlements. Millon, supra note 21, at 22-24.
This is another situation in which progressives and contractarians tend to talk past one
another. In a zero transaction cost world, no such background entitlements would be
necessary. Suppose you have an idea and I have money (or labor). We reach agreed-upon
terms of exchange. If we had perfect information and zero transaction costs, our bargain
could be complete. In the real world, these conditions are not met and our bargain is
necessarily incomplete. Some background legal rules are necessary to fill out the inevita-
ble gaps in our agreement. Millon and I are in agreement up to this point. Where we
diverge, however, is that I, as a conservative contractarian, regard corporate law default
rules not as entitlements but as our best guess as to what parties would rationally agree to
in the absence of any pre-existing set of imposed terms. If standard form agreements are
properly thought of as contracts, the existence of a background set of default rules thus
does not undermine the essentially contractual nature of corporate law.
32 This follows from a straightforward application of the Coase Theorem. The obliga-
tory cite for this proposition is R-H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-15
(1960).
33 Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423, 1430 (1993). As I have argued else-
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Bratton appreciates this argument but contends that hypothetical
bargaining does not allow meaningful predictions about the rules par-
ties would choose in a zero-transaction-cost environment. He instead
urges decisionmakers to look for legal norms in long-standing doc-
trine and real-world practice rather than in law and economics jour-
nals.3 4 Although I am in complete sympathy with Bratton's basic
argument that honor and trust are important social norms, I neverthe-
less conclude that he both overstates hypothetical bargaining's flaws
and understates the drawbacks to his proposed alternative.
Bratton, drawing on the game theory tenet that games lacking a
single, first best equilibrium instead have multiple equilibria,35 posits
that one cannot use the hypothetical bargaining method to develop
default rules for corporate law problems because the possibility of
multiple solutions renders the hypothetical bargain indeterminate.3 6
Granting that some, but not all, games have multiple equilibria,37
where does that leave us? Corporate law decisionmakers still need
some filter for determining which rules to adopt. The process of legal
reasoning by which such rules are developed should be replicable,
and the rules themselves should promote certainty and predictabil-
ity.38 How does Bratton propose to develop such rules? In the con-
text of fiduciary duty rules, the subject of his essay, Bratton endorses a
system of "muddy defaults" through which judges evaluate a fiduci-
where, a rule of limited liability plausibly emerges from this hypothetical bargaining
process.
34 Bratton's April 8th letter, supra note 21. In an important series of articles, Ian
Ayres and Robert Gertner have also taken issue with the hypothetical bargain methodol-
ogy. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contribu-
tions of Easterbrook and FischA 59 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1391 (1992). A critique of this analysis
requires more space than permitted in this context. Suffice it here to say that Ayres him-
self admits that this analysis qualifies, but does not refute, the hypothetical bargain meth-
odology. Ares, supra, at 1419.
35 Bratton, supra note 11, at 153.
36 Bratton also observes that information asymmetries may preclude parties from bar-
gaining to an efficient result even in a zero-transaction-cost environment. Id. This point is
not very telling, however, if we treat information asymmetries as a form of transaction cost
in response to which contractarians can deploy the usual array of responses to high trans-
action costs, such as the use of hypothetical bargaining to develop default rules or the use
of intermediaries (such as underwriters) to lower transaction costs.
37 In the real world, we obviously cannot predict the outcome of any particular bar-
gain with complete certainty. In many circumstances, however, we can predict with a high
degree of confidence the expected outcome of many bargains. Consider a simple variant
of the Monty Hall game. I offer you the following deal: you can have $5 or take the
curtain. There is a 50% chance that $10 is behind the curtain and a 50% chance that there
is nothing behind the curtain. I cannot know ex ante whether you will take the curtain or
the $5, but rational choice theory allows me to predict that most people will take the sure
$5 because most people are risk-averse.
38 See, e.g., Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. Ch. 1974) ("It is obviously
important that the Delaware corporate law have stability and predictability.").
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ary's action ex post.39 In doing so, judges should promote trust40 by
looking "to intuitive fairness determinations well-informed by the cir-
cumstances of the case and heavily influenced by the burden of proof
allocation, but only loosely informed by knowledge of general busi-
ness practices. ' '41
Although the above-quoted passage downplays the role of real
world practice, another passage more clearly implies that corporate
law should be based on the social norms reflected in real-world busi-
ness practices. 42 Our subsequent correspondence confirmed that this
is Bratton's intent.43 In any case, I chose to focus on that aspect of his
proposal because an emphasis on real-world business norms, along
with an admirable respect for old precedents, is all that prevents Brat-
ton's methodology from collapsing into an invitation for judges to
make up the rules as they go along.44
I concede the relevance of social norms to the adjudicative pro-
cess, but I nevertheless remain unpersuaded by Bratton's proposal.
Consider a classic fiduciary duty case, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas &?
Electric Co.45 This was an interested director transaction, in which one
John F. Maynard served as a director for the defendant at the same
time he was plaintiff's principal stockholder, president, and director.46
Maynard was actively involved in negotiating a contract between plain-
tiff and defendant, which proved to be unprofitable for the latter.47
Surely we can all agree on a moral norm relevant to the facts at bar:
don't cheat. One hopes that real-world business norms in fact pro-
scribe cheating. But what is cheating in this context? Certainly May-
nard should have disclosed all facts within his knowledge. But did he
need to refrain from voting? Would approval by independent direc-
tors have sufficed, or should they also have sought shareholder ratifi-
cation? Do we need to analyze the transaction for objective fairness?
Moral norms are very useful in defining broad rules of general appli-
cation, and even for defining narrow rules applicable to issues involv-
39 Bratton, supra note 11, at 164.
40 See id. at 165.
41 Id.
42 S id. at 168 ("The norm's transfer from business practice to the law facilitates its
communication to the large number of actors involved in production in firms.").
43 Bratton's argument is reminiscent of Holmes' well-known observation: "The life of
the law has not been logic: it has been experience." OLIER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LvW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Back Bay Books 1963) (1881). But Holmes
later opined that "the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of econom-
ics." OLVER WENDELL HOLMSS, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187
(1920).
44 I assume that all agree such a system would be undesirable. See Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Social Propositions and Common Law Adjudication, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 231, 233-39.
45 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918).
46 See id. at 378.
47 See id. at 378-79.
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ing moral questions, but they are blunt instruments poorly suited to
this sort of fine detail work. Would it shock the conscience, for exam-
ple, if the votes of an interested director counted in determining
whether shareholder ratification of a conflicted interest transaction
was effective? Few of us, with the possible exception of Justice Car-
dozo, have such a well-developed sense of commercial morality that
we can feel confident announcing, ex cathedra, an answer to that
question. 48
In contrast, law and economics provides a plausible and straight-
forward policy-based account of conflicted interest transactions pursu-
ant to which full disclosure and approval by independent directors
suffice to insulate such transactions from judicial review.49 Given the
difficulty of identifying dominant commercial practices, the best we
48 Seeking answers to these questions in real-world business practice also seems likely
to impose unacceptably high tertiary costs. We are not talking about trade usages, after all.
This brings up an interesting observation: to the extent he relies on real-world practice,
Bratton's methodology resembles that of Karl Llewellyn. As Alan Schwartz and Bob Scott
explain:
Llewellyn believed that a major purpose of the [Uniform Commercial]
Code was to resolve disputes according to the best "commercial morality."
He meant by this, as a methodological matter, that courts should deduce
moral norms from the customs of "good" merchants. An obvious objection
to this methodology ... is that courts lack the expertise to observe and
evaluate merchant practice....
Llewellyn ... believed that moral norms can be derived from actual
practices. But "oughts" cannot be derived from "what is." For example, the
question whether a particular business practice reflects "the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" cannot be
answered by the existence of the practice itself. The evaluator must have
some moral criteria, derived independently of the practice, by which to de-
cide what practices are "reasonable" and "fair." This means that a major
purpose of the Code is, from the viewpoint of interpretation, no purpose at
all; for to tell the courts to derive moral norms from merchant practices is
to tell them nothing useful-there is no "there" there.
ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
17-18 (2d ed. 1991) (footnotes omitted). (For an argument that economic analysis pro-
vides the necessary criteria for interpreting the Code, see id. at 21-28.) Bratton might well
concede the point, but would insist that notions of trust, fairness, and honor supply the
requisite criteria. But that takes us back to the problem ofjudges making it up as they go
along, according to the whims of individual morality, which is a form of statism.
49 See Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance 47 Bus. LAw. 461, 486-95
(1992). Lawrence Mitchell argues that the procedural/contractual understanding of fidu-
ciary law Dooley advocates erodes social trust. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Pro-
cess., in PROGRESSrVE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1, at 185, 186-87. Mitchell further rejects
the contractarian preference for a process-oriented approach to fiduciary duty on the
ground that courts are not in a position to detect process manipulations. Id. at 206. This is
consistent with his view that the business judgment rule exists because courts are poorly
equipped to detect breaches of duty. Id. at 192-93. As I have argued elsewhere, however,
the business judgment rule rests on an entirely different set of concerns, namely, the im-
portance of preserving the board's discretionary authority from judicial review. Courts in
fact appear to be quite capable of detecting process flaws that lead to substantively prob-
lematic results. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Govern-
ance Project, 61 GEo. WASH. L. Ra,. 1034, 1068-80 (1993).
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can hope for is an educated guess about the rule most actors would
choose if they could bargain, which the nexus-of-contracts model of-
fers. Until Bratton or someone else comes up with a model having
greater predictive power, contractarianism's place at the top of the
jurisprudential heap remains safe.
2. Organic Rules and Outcome Bargaining
Contractarians treat the corporation's organic rules as if they
arose through the trading of rights and duties among the corpora-
tion's various constituencies and, accordingly, treat those rules as
though they represent a bargain in which claims on the corporation
were sold to their highest-valuing user.50 The bargains struck will vary
from firm to firm, depending on a variety of factors, including the risk
preferences of each of the firm's constituencies and the thickness of
the markets in which the bargain is struck.5' Because the various con-
tracts making up the firm thus differ little from contracts created
through voluntary exchange, they enjoy a presumption in their favor,
and ought to be enforced in the same way other mutually beneficial
contracts are enforced. 52
Lawrence Mitchell rejects the contractarian account because the
corporation's constituencies do not and cannot bargain:
The idea that the bylaws of a public corporation were somehow bar-
gained for by the stockholders in a manner that can be said to give
rise to intent is troubling. In the first place, most public corpora-
tion stockholders have never read the corporation's bylaws, if they
even are aware of their existence. While it is possible to argue that
the stockholders should have read the bylaws, to which they became
bound by their purchasing stock, this in no way suggests any sort of
bargaining process that gives rise to mutual intent. At best they can
be said to have accepted the bylaws as one characteristic of the en-
tire corporation, within the context of corporate laws holding that
directors are fiduciaries of the corporation and its stockholders. 53
50 See Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuKE L.J. 173, 179.
51 See id.
52 See Ulen, supra note 7, at 322.
53 Mitchell, supra note 49, at 207. David Millon makes a similar argument on behalf
of the corporation's nonshareholder constituencies:
Particular kinds of conduct likely to be harmful to nonshareholders may be
difficult to foresee and to specify contractually with adequate precision.
This may result from informational advantages enjoyed by management,
which has direct access to confidential strategic plans and has no incentive
to disclose them voluntarily to employees or other nonshareholder constit-
uencies. Workers may be totally unaware of plans to shut down a plant and
shift production to another location, and may have been misled by state-
ments or other behavior seemingly suggesting a long-term commitment to
their welfare. Even if there is some sense that such shifts are always possi-
ble, even in the face of management indications to the contrary, employees
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This argument fundamentally misconceives the contractarian
project by ignoring the distinction between outcome and process bar-
gaining. A bargain can be understood in two distinct ways: as a pro-
cess, which is how Mitchell appears to understand it, or as an
outcome. As Mitchell correctly notes, there is no bargaining process
between a shareholder and the public corporations in which he in-
vests. But there is an outcome-the set of organic rules contained in
the articles and bylaws as drafted by the corporation's founders or di-
rectors-that can fairly be described as a bargain. A bargain involving
only an outcome is just as much a contract as a bargain involving both
a process and an outcome.
Perhaps I can be forgiven for trying to make the point by borrow-
ing a favorite tool of leftist scholars: storytelling. A while back I flew
into LAX and headed out to a car rental lot. There was a huge line
growing faster than it was being served, so there were many impatient
travellers behind me by the time I reached the front. The agent
handed me a long, detailed standard form agreement. Did I bargain
over the agreement's terms? No, of course not. Did I even read the
agreement? No, of course not. Was the agreement nevertheless a
binding contract? Although some cases have treated particularly op-
pressive clauses of such agreements as contracts of adhesion, the fact
that I did not read it would likely not be enough to prevent enforce-
ment of the agreement as a binding contract.54 If accepting a stan-
dard form agreement from a car rental company can be
conceptualized as a form of bargaining, why isn't the same true of the
unversed shareholder who blithely accepts the corporation's bylaws?55
Shareholders accept the trade-offs inherent in the standard form con-
tract offered by the corporation,just as I accepted the trade-offs inher-
are much less likely to bargain for protection than they would be if they
knew of management's actual plans to close a plant or of a more general
corporate policy to lay off workers whenever it is in the shareholders' inter-
est to do so.
Millon, supra note 21, at 5-6. These observations are true, but not unique to the corporate
context. Mid-stream changes are a problem in any long-term relational contract, because
all such contracts are subject to uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism. Millon's argu-
ment only has traction if (1) there is some exogenous reason workers and similar non-
shareholder corporate constituencies should be privileged vis-a-vis parties to other
relational contracts and (2) Millon can demonstrate that expanding corporate law's regu-
latory purview is a better means of addressing mid-stream modifications than, say, labor law
reform.
54 See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 267, 269 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993)
("[W]hen a policy contains sufficiently clear language, it matters not that the insured in
fact failed to read it.") (citations omitted).
55 See Ribstein, supra note 9, at 990 (noting that the concept of contract includes
voluntary agreements established by default legal rules and standard form agreements).
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ent in the standard form rental agreement offered me by the car
rental company.56
3. Summary
In sum, the progressives are correct in asserting that contractari-
anism is incomplete, but so what? Admittedly this distinction is not
always acknowledged in the contractarian literature, but I suggest that
the nexus-of-contracts model is properly viewed as a metaphor rather
than as a positive account of economic reality. Contractarianism is
analogous to Newtonian physics, which no longer claims to be an ac-
curate representation of the laws of physics, but yet provides a simple
model that adequately explains a large and important set of physical
phenomena.
Given this, most of Progressive Corporate Law's authors are asking
the wrong questions about the nexus-of-contacts model. A theory is
properly judged by its predictive power with respect to the phenom-
ena it purports to explain,57 not by whether it is a valid description of
an objective reality.58 As such, "the relevant question to ask about the
'assumptions' of a theory is not whether they are descriptively 'realis-
tic,' for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approxi-
mations for the purpose in hand."59  As demonstrated above,
Progressive Corporate Law's authors have failed to disprove contractari-
anism's claim of predictive sufficiency. 60 Further, if it takes a theory to
beat a theory, we shall see in Part III that the progressives have also
failed to offer a credible alternative to the nexus of contracts model.
II
ECONOMIC MAN
As with any theory claiming predictive power, the contractarian
model rests on a theory of human behavior. "Economic Man" is an
autonomous individual who makes rational choices that maximize his
56 Mitchell further asserts that uncertainty means that contract cannot fully substitute
for trust as a basis for intra-corporate relationships. Because complexity and bounded ra-
tionality preclude complete contracting under uncertainty, trust is necessary for social rela-
tions to persevere. Mitchell, supra note 49, at 197. The corporate contract, however, has
two attributes that allow it to deal with uncertainty. One is authority, that is, the delegation
of power to a central agency authorized to rewrite the terms of the corporate contract in
the face of changed circumstances. The other is the right of exit, or voice, embodied in
the free transferability of shares to a prospective acquiror. At least insofar as shareholders
are concerned, exit is a low-cost option.
57 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economis, in EssAYs IN POSrrIVF.
ECONOMIcS 23, 27 (1985).
58 See id. at 30 ("[Ilmportant and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'as-
sumptions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality ... .
59 Id.
60 See supra Part I.G.1-2.
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satisfactions. 61 In Progressive Corporate Law, Lynne Dallas criticizes the
Economic Man model for failing to account for social justice con-
cerns, specifically the equitable distribution of wealth. 62 Theresa
Gabaldon likewise complains that Economic Man is a morally unat-
tractive "guiding myth."63 Moreover, William Bratton argues that Eco-
nomic Man is an incomplete model of human behavior.64
To clear up a frequent misconception at the outset, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that the Economic Man is not "driven by purely
pecuniary incentives. '6 5 Because rational choice theory encompasses
all incentives to which humans respond, including such things as risk
aversion and even a generalized sense of fairness, the progressive cri-
tique loses much of its traction. Empirical research on human deci-
sionmaking tends to show behavior that is inconsistent with purely
selfish behavior, but is nevertheless consistent with rational choice
theory.66 Much of the progressive critique of the Economic Man
model is thus directed at a caricature, rather than the real economic
model.
61 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990). For a very useful
summary of rational choice theory, and the recent empirical work on it, see Thomas S.
Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 487 (1994).
62 Dallas, supra note 21, at 44.
63 Theresa Gabaldon, Experiencing Limited Liability: On Insularity and Inbreeding in Cor-
porate Law, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at 111, 117-18.
64 Bratton, supra note 11, at 166-67.
65 POSNER, supra note 61, at 382. Given that Economic Man is driven by incentives,
the progressive critique of Economic Man actually turns out to be quite surprising. Judge
Posner claims that Economic Man "is a person whose behavior is completely determined by
incentives; his rationality is no different from that of a pigeon or a rat." Id. This is a
perspective on human nature essentially identical with that of the evolutionists: man is
merely an animal, morally indistinguishable from any other animal. As such, it is a world
view one might reasonably expect progressives to be comfortable with. Cf Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought 81 IOWA L. REv. 149, 151-52
(1995) (linking the rise of progressive legal thought to Reform Darwinism).
66 See Ulen, supra note 61, at 498. Consider, for example, the progressive communi-
tarian assumption that trustworthiness regularly requires one to act against one's interest.
See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the
Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW, supra note 1, at 219, 223 (arguing that goodwill trust is neither purely
instrumental nor self-interested). However, game theorists have identified some very
strong incentives for individuals to behave cooperatively. Consider, for example, that one
powerful strategy in an infinitely repeated game is to play on a tit-for-tat basis. Player 1
begins by cooperating, and then chooses in each subsequent round to play as Player 2 did
on his previous choice. In effect, tit-for-tat can train the opposing player to be cooperative.
SeeJ. KEITH MURNIGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES 81-84 (1992). In other words, trustworthy be-
havior is not only honorable, it is also useful. As such, there is no inconsistency between
the notion that people "irrationally" honor their commitments and a model of human
behavior based on rational choice. SeeJames Q. Wilson, What is Moral, and How Do We
Know It , COMMENTARY, June 1993, at 37, 39-40. Consistently trustworthy behavior sends a
message about reliability that pays long-term benefits under many, albeit not all, market
conditions.
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The progressive critique becomes even less troubling when we ad-
mit that the Economic Man, like the nexus-of-contracts model, is sim-
ply an abstraction developed as a useful model for predicting the
behavior of large numbers of people. Conservatives do not deny the
unreality of Economic Man. A pure Economic Man "would be a feral
monster with no partners or customers." 67 As such, the model is not
intended to describe real people embedded in a real social order.68
Admitting that Economic Man is merely a partial explanation of
human behavior is no more fatal to the law and economics movement
than is the same admission with respect to contractarian theory.69 If it
takes a theory to beat a theory, moreover, critics of the rational choice
model may fairly be asked to put forward an alternative methodology
that can better assist us in understanding the real world effects of legal
rules. 70 As I argue in the next Part, communitarianism fails to offer
any more robust insights into law than economics.
III
THE PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE
Although Progressive Corporate Law's authors are united in their
rejection of the contractarian model and of the Economic Man
model, they achieve less unity in offering an alternative theory of the
firm. To the extent a common theme can be identified it is the ten-
dency towards a leftist version of communitarianism. David Millon's
chapter provides the most detailed treatment of the communitarian
alternative to contractarianism. According to Millon, communitarians
argue that relationships within the corporation are not arm's-length
market relationships, but rather are based on trust and mutual inter-
dependence. 71 In their view, this requires corporate decisionmakers
to be sensitive to the needs of all the corporation's constituencies; fair
dealing requires that intracorporate relationships not be unilaterally
abrogated to'benefit shareholders. 72 In my view, Millon's treatment
67 Jeffrey Hart, In Dispute: Dream Weaver, NAT'L REV., Mar. 25, 1996, at 60.
68 Cf. MICHAEL NOvAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 16 (2d ed. 1990)
(making the same point about economic analysis in general).
69 See POSNER, supra note 61, at 366. I leave to others with greater expertise in non-
market areas of the law the question of whether economic analysis is a useful positive tool
in those areas. For a defense of an affirmative answer, see id. at 367-70.
70 Gabaldon rejects the rational actor model in favor of anecdotal story-telling.
Gabaldon, supra note 63, at 120. The difficulty with this approach is that the creation of
public policy requires us to make predictions about the behavior of large numbers of peo-
ple. Rational pursuit of self-interest is a more likely candidate for this job than any story
told by progressive academics. Gabaldon acknowledges this problem, but claims that it can
be solved by checking the validity of her stories against "common sense." Id. However, like
beauty, common sense is very much an eye-of-the-beholder concept.
71 Millon, supra note 21, at 9.
72 See id. at 10.
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of the communitarian argument justifies characterizing him as a pro-
gressive with significant communitarian tendencies, leavened with an
awareness of communitarianism's flaws.
Several of Progressive Corporate Law's other authors write from a
perspective that is communitarian in all but name. Lynne Dallas, for
example, offers a so-called "power coalition theory," the rhetoric of
which is essentially communitarian. 73 Lawrence Mitchell denies being
a communitarian, although he expresses sympathy for that view.74
Mitchell's admitted communitarian sympathies come into play as he
emphasizes the concept of trust as a social virtue. Mitchell does so
because it promotes "a society emphasizing cooperation and cohe-
sion," which he prefers to "one that breeds conflict and enmity. 75
Marleen O'Connor likewise lays great emphasis on the role of trust in
corporate relationships.7 6 In a personal correspondence, William
Bratton expressly disclaimed both the communitarian and progressive
labels.77 Although Bratton thus may represent the right wing of the
progressive corporate legal academy, there is arguably enough overlap
between his views and those of Progressive Corporate Law's unabashedly
progressive authors to justify his inclusion with them.
In this Part, I first consider whether the progressive brand of
communitarianism offers a viable alternative to the contractarian
model from either a descriptive or a predictive perspective. I con-
clude that it does not. I then contrast progressive communitarianism
to the Tory communitarianism of modern conservatives. I conclude
that conservatives are more likely to find common ground with con-
tractarians than with progressives.
A. Testing the Progressive Communitarian Theory of the Firm
Traditional forms of legal scholarship were primarily backward-
looking. One reasoned from old precedents to decide a present case,
seemingly without much concern (at least explicitly) for the effect of
today's decision on future behavior. Yet, law is necessarily forward-
looking. To be sure, a major function of our legal system is to resolve
present disputes, but law's principal function is to regulate future be-
havior. Contractarianism (like law and economics generally) suc-
73 Dallas, supra note 21, at 49-50 (discussing dependencies taken into account by the
power coalition theory); id. at 51 (asserting that the power coalition theory is set on the
basis of morality and recognizes that people are members of communities rather than
economically-rational, autonomous individuals).
74 Mitchell, supra note 49, at 199.
75 Id.
76 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 223.
77 Letter from William Bratton, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, to Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law (Apr. 12, 1996) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Bratton's April 12th letter].
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ceeded because it offers a tool for exploring and predicting human
responses to regulation. Unless progressive scholars can provide an
alternative paradigm that offers judges and lawyers a more robust
model for making such predictions, their movement will remain of
little every-day use to the legal system.
The progressive jurisprudence represented by Progressive Corporate
Law has thus far failed to answer this challenge. As we have seen, the
main alternative to contractarianism offered therein is a communitar-
ian model in which people relate to one another through trust and
mutual interdependence. As I argue in this section, however, commu-
nitarianism is unlikely to prove a very fruitful alternative to the law
and economics model.78
1. The Descriptive Power of Progressive Corporate Communitarianism
Although a conservative contractarian willingly concedes that his
economic models do not accurately depict the real world, he urges his
progressive communitarian friends to remove the beam from their
eyes before attempting to take the splinter out of his. For example,
the progressive communitarian account of the shareholder-corporate
relationship is almost wholly unrecognizable. Recall that progressive
communitarians emphasize notions of trust and mutual interdepen-
dence between corporate constituents. According to Marleen
O'Connor, for example, trust evolves over time in a relationship as the
parties prove themselves to be trustworthy.79 Further, she opines,
trust arises as feelings of fellowship develop.80 In today's market, how-
ever, individuals increasingly hold widely diversified portfolios, usually
through pension or mutual funds.8' For such investors, corporate
stock evidences not a relationship of trust and mutual interdepen-
dence, but a commodity little different from pork bellies.
This observation relates back to the distinction drawn above be-
tween process and outcome bargains. A diversified shareholder typi-
78 Criticizing progressives for failing to offer a plausible alternative to the law and
economics model of human behavior is perhaps slightly unfair, because doing so does not
seem to be their main goal. Instead, the progressive project is nothing less than a whole-
sale remaking of society, such that retaking corporate law from the contractarians thus
seems to be more a means than an end. Cf Mitchell, supra note 21, at xiv (arguing that
unlike earlier corporate social responsibility scholars, many of Progressive Corporate Law's
authors are less concerned with imposing social constraints on corporations than with re-
making corporations in the progressive image).
79 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 223.
80 Id. In fairness, it should be acknowledged that O'Connor's essay focuses on work-
ers' rights, not the shareholder-corporate relationship. However, other essays in the book
rely upon the communitarian model to explain the shareholder-corporation relationship.
See Bratton, supra note 11, at 140; Mitchell, supra note 49, at 184.
81 See RoE, supra note 18, at 125 (presenting tabular data indicating that in 1993
46.9% of the equity market was controlled by pensions, and mutual funds and insurers).
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cally buys shares without paying much more attention to the
corporate contract than one pays to the car rental lease agreement.
The investor's lack of concern is premised not on trust of corporate
management, but on comparison of the risk involved in failing to fa-
miliarize oneself with the corporation's organic documents to the op-
portunity cost of doing so.
The one situation in which the corporate-shareholder relation-
ship might fairly be characterized as one of trust and mutual interde-
pendence is the closely-held corporation. Only here do we find the
degree of mutual interaction likely to give rise to the sort of evolution-
ary process O'Connor describes. In the close corporation context,
however, the transaction costs of bargaining are far lower than in a
public corporation. The contractarian model thus seems especially
apt for the close corporation context.
In contrast, the communitarian model posits that:
the retired teacher in California who has invested in Union Carbide
stock through participation in California Public Employee Retire-
ment System, the factory worker in Pennsylvania, and the relatives
of a dead peasant in central India all belong to a single community
characterized by ties of mutual interdependence and a history of
cooperative activity. 82
Tellingly, David Millon elsewhere opines that the communitarian ar-
gument as applied to such firms strains credulity past the breaking
point.8 3 The conservative contractarian concurs with Millon that any
effort to ascribe communitarian values to multinational corporations
is doomed.8 4 Instead, the conservative contractarian finds communi-
82 Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, supra note 22, at 127. Deborah DeMott's re-
view of Progressive Corporate Law correctly points out that the communitarian project fails to
account for changes in both the workforce and the investor community. DeMott, supra
note 13, at 1323-24.
83 Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, supra note 22, at 127. As Millon in effect
concedes, there is a fundamental flaw in any effort to develop a communitarian account of
the large public corporation. Roberta Romano explains why the leftist vision embraced by
most of Progressive Corporate Lads authors is essentially inconsistent with large public
corporations:
Adherents of this vision maintain that the decentralization of corporate or-
ganizations, involving direct participation in firm decisionmaking by all
members, is a prerequisite for establishing fully participatory political struc-
tures. For a decentralized communitarian system to work, societal units,
being predicated on the economic and political equality of their members,
must possess attributes of smallness and sameness. These characteristics
cannot survive within large hierarchical corporations, whose dynamics un-
dermine and destabilize the egalitarian basis of social relationships.
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REv. 923, 948 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
84 Russell Kirk was notably critical of large corporations. E.g., RUSSELL KRK, THE POLI-
TICS OF PRUDENCE 117-24 (1993) (blaming the large automakers for many of Detroit's ills).
In contrast, Michael Novak has tried very hard to impart a communitarian gloss to the
business corporation. E.g., NovAE, supra note 68, at 29 ("In the economic sphere today
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tarian values in smaller settings: neighborhoods, churches, social
clubs, and even in pockets of the internet.
2. The Predictive Power of Progressive Corporate Communitarianism
As discussed above, the law and economics school's predictive
models of human behavior are, more or less, subject to testing.8 5 The
predictions generated by these models are generally "borne out by the
empirical evidence."8 6 What does the progressive communitarian ap-
proach offer as a replacement? Consider a concrete example taken
from the core of the progressive communitarian project: the corpo-
rate law rights of nonshareholder constituencies. I adopt an admit-
tedly somewhat awkward phrase, "stakeholderism," for those who
support the idea that corporations should be responsive to the inter-
ests of workers, consumers, and communities, not just to those of
shareholders. Many of Progressive Corporate Law's authors embrace
some version of this stakeholderist ideal.8 7
Corporate law is concerned almost solely with the rights and in-
terests of shareholders and, to a far lesser extent, creditors. The issue
here is whether the regulatory purview of corporate law should be ex-
panded to include the corporation's relationships with other corpo-
rate constituencies. Should directors be empowered, or even
required, to consider the effect of their decisions on constituencies
other than shareholders? Contractarians believe that nonshareholder
constituencies are adequately protected through contract and/or gen-
eral welfare law. Accordingly, corporate law should not be called upon
to provide these constituencies with extra protections.88 Stakeholder-
ists emphatically reject this claim. 89
Most stakeholderist 'scholarship focuses on the corporate law
rights of employees. 90 According to the stakeholderists, perceptions of
procedural justice are important to corporate efficiency. Granting
employees a voice in corporate decisionmaking promotes a sense of
sociality seems far more prevalent than individualism."). As we shall see below, Novak's
argument becomes more plausible if we treat the corporation not as a single community,
but as a collection of many smaller communities.
85 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
86 Ulen, supra note 61, at 488-89.
87 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 21, at 4-10; O'Connor, supra note 66, at 219-24; Lewis D.
Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held
Corporations-A Critical Assessment, in PRocREssrvE CORPORATE LAw, supra note 1, at 281,
281-85.
88 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 1443-44.
89 See, e.g., Millon, supra note 21, at 4-10.
90 Notable exceptions include important articles on bondholders by Lawrence Mitch-
ell and William Bratton. William W. Bratton,Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in
a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DuK. L.J. 92; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Coipo-
rate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1990).
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justice, increasing trust and commitment within the enterprise, and,
in turn productivity.91 The theory seems to hold that having a say in
corporate decisionmaking leads workers to view their efforts as part of
a collaborative undertaking, rather than as just a job. In turn, this
leads to enhanced job satisfaction, which results in a greater intensity
of effort and ultimately to a more efficient firm.
Although this view of employee involvement has become nearly
hegemonic among the stakeholderists, it is perhaps most closely asso-
ciated with my friend Marleen O'Connor, who has done much of the
progressives' heavy lifting in this area. In a series of articles, she has
argued for various changes in corporate and labor law designed to
protect and empower workers.92 At the core of her argument is
Leibenstein's concept of x-inefficiency: the gap between the firm's
actual productive output and the output level that could be achieved
under ideal circumstances. 93 The size of this gap is supposedly corre-
lated to the extent to which a firm includes its employees in the deci-
sionmaking process. As the theory goes, workers who view their jobs
as part of a collaborative process will work harder than workers who
are subjected to traditional hierarchial monitoring.94
This presents an opportunity to test the predictive power of pro-
gressive communitarianism. If the stakeholderist models are valid,
there should be empirical evidence demonstrating a link between em-
ployee participation in corporate decisionmaking, worker morale, and
firm productivity.95
One major review of the empirical literature concludes that re-
sults of employee involvement studies are all over the map, ranging
from no benefit, to inconclusive results, to findings of substantial
gains.96 A frequently cited meta-review of twenty-nine studies likewise
91 See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 21, at 44.
92 E.g., O'Connor, supra note 66; Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconcptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. RE-V.
899 (1993) [hereinafter O'Connor, Human Capital].
93 HAR-vEY LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM: THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY 32 (1987);
see also O'Connor, supra note 66, at 224.
94 See O'Connor. supra note 66, at 224.
95 Despite the plethora of empirical studies published on employee involvement in
corporate decisionmaking, much of the evidence is of dubious worth. Many studies are
anecdotal in nature. Failures tend to be under-reported. See GUILLERMOJ. GRENIER, INHU-
MAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 9 (1988).
Hidden costs that should be reflected in a valid cost-benefit analysis are ignored. SeeJOHN
L. COTTON, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 64 (1993). Moreover, many studies derive their con-
clusions from self-appraisal by managers. See id. at 46. Given that those same managers
presumably were responsible for adopting employee participation programs in the first
place or report to those who adopted them, management-derived data is likely to be bi-
ased. All of these flaws tend to undermine any claim that the communitarian model of the
employment relationship has empirical support.
96 See COTTON, supra note 95, at 14-17 (reviewing various meta-analyses of the empiri-
cal research published in this area).
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found only fourteen that reported measurably positive effects of em-
ployee participation on productivity, two that found negative effects,
and thirteen that were inconclusive. 97 In sum, there seems to be no
conclusive evidence that employee involvement in corporate decision-
making leads to any identifiable long-term economic benefits.98
Stakeholderists are likely to object on the grounds that empirical
research on voluntary ad hoc participation programs tells us relatively
little about the likely effect of legally mandated worker involvement in
corporate governance. Instead, the stakeholderists commonly point
to Japan and Germany, and assert that their firms are more efficient
than United States firms, precisely because those nations mandate em-
ployee involvement.99 Although admirers of German and Japanese
corporate systems claim they promote long-term commitments to the
firm and investments in firm-specific assets by workers, this claim is
not supported by the evidence. 100 Despite conventional wisdom about
German and Japanese competitive success, American enterprise in
many respects is winning the global competitiveness war.'0 ' Over the
last decade, in fact, the U.S. economy has performed as well or better
than those ofJapan or Germany. 10 2 As a result, Japanese and German
growth rates no longer exceed the U.S. rate, for example, as they did
during the post-war recovery period.'0 3
On close examination, moreover, the evidence on employee in-
volvement in Germany and Japan falls far short of making a compel-
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HIGH PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES AND FIRM PERFORM-
ANCE 5-9 (1993). In general, the Department of Labor concludes that employee involve-
ment is most likely to have positive effects when linked with other high performance
programs (such as skills training and pay for performance). Id. at 15. This may suggest
that such programs have effects swamping those of employee involvement policies. See also
THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 153-
77 (2d ed. 1994) (summarizing case studies showing generally positive but variable results).
But see Arnold E. Perl, Employee Involvement Groups: The Outcry over the NLRB's Electromation
Decision, 44 LAB. LJ. 195, 204-06 (1993) (summarizing studies finding positive economic
effects of those programs).
98 It is also noteworthy that some prominent employee involvement experts express
skepticism about claims that this approach has any positive productivity effect. See, e.g.,
GRENIER, supra note 95, at 6-10 (raising doubts about the efficacy of quality circles); RAY-
MOND L. HOGLER & GUILLERMOJ. GRENIER, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR LAwv IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 103 (1992) (finding that "despite acclaim for the improved produc-
tivity achieved through employee participation and 'Quality Circles,' the evidence to sup-
port the proposition is not altogether convincing, particularly in nonunion workplaces");
David I. Levine, Public Policy Implications of Imperfections in the Market for Worker Participation,
13 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 183, 185 (1992) (noting that most employee involvement
plans are unsuccessful, but claiming that those few following Levine's criteria succeed).
99 See, e.g., O'Connor, Human Capita4 supra note 92, at 912-13.
100 See ROE, supra note 18, at 254-56.
101 See Hobart Rowen, Challenging Convention on Productivity, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
1992, at HI.
102 See Stakeholder Capitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23, 23-24.
103 See id. at 24.
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ling case for the progressive communitarian account. Employee
involvement is both less pervasive and less successful in Japan than the
proponents of mandatory employee participation acknowledge. 104
According to one report only one-third of the quality circles used by
Japanese firms have proven successful over time.' 0 5 Another report
opines that Japanese employee participation programs have the func-
tion of promoting organizational learning, but tend to withhold
meaningful power from employees. 0 6 German-style codetermination
has been found to have the least impact on productivity and employee
attitudes of any participatory management scheme. 10 7 Indeed, while
studies of codetermination often have been inconclusive, some have
shown it to have negative productivity results.108 Finally, although
countries practicing stakeholderism ought to enjoy high and stable
employment, both the United States and England have lower unem-
ployment rates than Germany (albeit not lower than Japan).109
Interestingly, stakeholderism is currently under attack in both
Germany and Japan. In Germany, the combined pressures of high
production costs and international competition have encouraged
large German firms to shift production abroad to less regulatory
states. 110 There is also growing political pressure to deregulate Ger-
man labor laws."' A similar pattern has been observed in Japan. 112
Even more strikingly, some large Japanese firms appear to be shifting
their focus to shareholder wealth maximization. 1 3
104 The Economist points out that although Japan consistently invests more of its GDP
than other countries, the German investment rate is comparable to that of the United
States and England. Id. Conceding that GDP does not pick up investments in firm-specific
human capital, this nevertheless tends to undermine the progressive communitarian
argument.
105 See CoTrON, supra note 95, at 78.
106 Motohiro Morishima et. al., Industrial Democracy in Selected Pacific Rim and Eu-
ropean Countries 12 (Presentation at the Conference on Industrial Democracy Issues for
the 21st Century, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign College of Law, Apr. 12,
1995) (copy on file with author).
107 See Co--roN, supra note 95, at 232.
108 See id. at 118-21. One especially surprising study found that, for German firms that
became subject to codetermination by virtue of a 1976 statute, productivity declined but
profitability increased. See Michael A. Gurdon & Anoop Rai, Codetermination and Enterprise
Performance: Empirical Evidence from West Germany, 42J. ECON. & Bus. 289, 298-300 (1990).
The authors do not clearly explain this seeming contradiction. A more recent study of
German firms affected by the 1976 statute found that they suffered declines in both pro-
ductivity and profitability while experiencing no decline in labor costs. See Felix R. FitzRoy
& Kornelius Kraft, Economic Effects of Codetermination, 95 SCANDiNAVWAN J. ECON. 365, 868-73
(1993).
109 See Stakeholder Capitalism, supra note 102, at 24.
11o See id. at 25.
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
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One should not succumb to the temptation to score a debater's
point by arguing that this evidence points to the inescapable superior-
ity of American corporate governance and industrial relations. The
impact of corporate governance rules on productivity and competi-
tiveness is undoubtedly swamped by other economic and political fac-
tors.1 1 4 At the very least, however, this evidence tends to undermine
any claim that the stakeholderist story has predictive power.
The communitarian model's lack of predictive power is especially
apparent when one begins to evaluate progressive proposals for ex-
panding corporate law's regulatory jurisdiction to include the rights
of nonshareholder constituencies. Marleen O'Connor, for one, ar-
gues in favor of a multifiduciary duty running from directors to work-
ers.115 Space does not permit me to rehash the arguments I have
made elsewhere against the creation of such a duty.1 6 It suffices to
note David Millon's observation that multifiduciary duties of this sort
are inherently indeterminate." 7 Ironically, the need for a more de-
terminate alternative ultimately leads Millon to embrace a modified
form of contractarianism." 8
114 Roberta Romano persuasively argues both that perceived disparities between U.S.
andJapanese or German productivity are incorrectly overstated in favor of the latter and
that there is no evidence to support the claim that any such disparities are causally linked
to corporate governance arrangements. Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing
Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102 YALE L.J. 2021. 2023-26 (1993).
115 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 219-21.
116 Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 1432-46 (explaining how multi-fiduciary model would
encourage managerial misconduct); see also Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Sharehold-
ers, Nonshareholders and Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEl.. J.
CORP. L. 393, 418-22 (1993) (discussing the increased transaction costs and loss of effi-
ciency that would result from adopting the progressive corporate communitarian agenda).
In addition to the points made in my earlier article, and those made by DeBow and
Lee, however, a word should be said about path dependency. Stakeholderists rarely give
much credence to the power of path dependency. For example, Lynne Dallas acknowl-
edges that legal rules, social and cultural norms, and self-interest encourage management
fidelity to shareholder wealth maximization, but contends that managers might willingly
pursue non-wealth maximization goals, if "legal rules, social norms, or cultural values
change." Dallas, supra note 21, at 46. This argument ignores the basic fact that the United
States started at a different point than did Japan and Germany, which favored a different
path. Institutions grew up in all three economies in response to the initial choice, deepen-
ing path dependency. As to the role of path dependency in corporate law, see MarkJ. Roe,
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 641, 643-62 (1996). In sum,
path dependence confirms Montesquieu's observation that law cannot be expected to de-
velop universal patterns:
For men's circumstances vary mightily one from another-affected by cli-
mate, by soil, by extent of country, by historic experience, by customs and
habits, by strategic situation, by commerce and industry, by religion, by a
multitude of other influences. Therefore every people develop their own
particular laws, and rightly so.
KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 352 (1991) (discussing Montesquieu's theory of
law).
117 Millon, supra note 21, at 13; cf. O'Connor, supra note 66, at 230-34.
118 Millon, supra note 21, at 22-30.
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B. Communitarians to the Left; Communitarians to the Right
At this point it is necessary to define the term "conservative con-
tractarian." I intend the phrase to embrace only those corporate law
scholars who accept the nexus-of-contracts model (and Economic
Man) as the operational theory of the firm. But how does the con-
servative contractarian differ from mainstream contractarians? The
answer lies in the scholar's political world view. Most contractarians,
at least insofar as corporate law is concerned, are liberals in the classi-
cal sense."19 The link between contractarianism and classical liber-
alism arguably derives from the essentially atomistic perspective of the
nexus-of-contracts model. Contractarianism regards the corporation
as a legal fiction created by the bargains struck between consenting
individuals.1 20 The fact that the autonomous individual is the basic
analytical unit of both world views121 makes it quite natural for those
who embrace one to accept the other. 22
In contrast, the conservative contractarian is informed by the
Burkean tradition that rejects the cult of the autonomous individual.
Tory conservatism envisions a community of the spirit, bound to-
gether by chains of custom, prescription, loyalty, and honor.123 Con-
servatives believe that only someone "bemused by reductions and
abstractions" would doubt that "within a (largely) market economy
there are going to be all sorts of non-economic groupings and activi-
119 Consider Mark Roe's observation that "[mlany [corporate and business law schol-
ars] have an underlying policy preference for limiting government directives." Roe, supra
note 116, at 667-68. Consider also Richard Posner's rejection of natural law. See Phillip E.
Johnson, Nihilism and the End of Law, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1993, at 19, 20-21 (presenting a
conservative critique of Posner's position on natural law). Although Posner is a con-
tractarian, he is not, by any meaningful definition of the term, a conservative. Russell
Kirk's classic "canons of conservative thought" include six elements: (1) belief in a tran-
scendent order and natural law; (2) rejection of egalitarianism and utilitarianism; (3) sup-
port for class and order; (4) belief in the linkage between freedom and private property;
(5) faith in prescription and custom; and (6) recognition that change is not necessarily
salutary reform. KIRK, supra note 11, at 8-9. Posner fails at least two-and-a-half of these
tests. Instead, as are many other contractarians, Posner is most accurately described as a
pragmatic classical liberal. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 23 (1995).
120 See Romano, supra note 83, at 933.
121 Judge Posner explicitly links the common law's tendency towards wealth maximiza-
tion with nineteenth century "laissez-faire ideology, which resembles (the] wealth max-
imization" norm of law and economics. POSNER, supra note 61, at 359.
122 Hence, David Millon's observation that communitarian corporate law scholars are
distinguished by their focus on "the sociological and moral phenomenon of the corpora-
tion as community," as opposed to the "individualistic, self-reliant, contractarian stance" of
mainstream corporate scholars. Millon, supra note 21, at 1. William Bratton similarly char-
acterizes contractarians as social Darwinists concerned with forcing society to evolve into a
model in which everyone is capable of self-protection and is fully self-reliant. Bratton,
supra note 11, at 150-52.
123 See, e.g., KIRK, supra note 11, at 483-88 (discussing the conservative reaction against
the decline.of community); KIRK, supra note 84, at 22-23 (listing upholding of voluntary
communities as one of ten basic conservative principles).
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ties that exercise a powerful influence on life as it is actually lived."1 24
In all aspects of life, including intracorporate relations, there always
occur relationships of trust, unspoken understandings, settled expec-
tations, and commitments that must be honored.125 It is precisely for
this reason that I rejected above any suggestion that either the nexus-
of-contracts model or Economic Man represented a fully realized so-
cial construct.126 The conservative contractarian accepts these -models
as first approximations, useful for predicting the behavior of large
masses of people, but nothing more. More importantly, the conserva-
tive contractarian further concedes that economic efficiency must
sometimes give way to virtue.127
In evaluating a legal regime, the conservative contractarian is
thus concerned not only with efficiency, but also with social order and
individual virtue.128 The conservative contractarian does not inquire
only into the Pareto optimality 29 of a given regime, but also asks of it
such questions as: Does this regime empower people to lead more
virtuous lives? Does this regime promote ordered liberty, tyranny, or
license?
At first blush, it may seem that the conservative contractarian has
much in common with the authors of Progressive Corporate Law and,
indeed, there is a subtle and perhaps amusing irony at work here. In
at least some rhetorical respects, there is a surprising degree of simi-
larity between progressive communitarianism and the philosophical
underpinnings of modern social conservatism. For example, there is
a particularly strong communitarian impulse among religious conserv-
atives,130 who place great importance upon local communities and
other mediating institutions as buffers against the encroaching powers
of the central state and the debased elites who set the moral tone of
secular society.' 31
124 Hart, supra note 67, at 60.
125 Id.; accord Francis Fukuyama, The Economics of Trust, NAT'L RE-v., Aug. 14, 1995, at
42, 42-43.
126 See supra Parts I, II.
127 Cf KIRK, supra note 84, at 122 ("A society that thinks only of alleged Efficiency,
regardless [of] the consequences to human beings, works its own ruin.").
128 As to the conservative understanding of order, see KiRK, supra note 116, at 3-5. For
a discussion of the conservative understanding of virtue, see id. at 99.
129 A Pareto optimal situation is one which is Pareto efficient; i.e., one in which it is
impossible to make one person better off without making another person worse off. See
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND GONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1997).
130 Cf Mark G. Malvasi, Quem Patrem? ME. Bradford's Southern Patrimony MOD. AGE,
Winter 1996, at 143, 147 ("He knew the calamity that the autonomous self could visit upon
the rest of mankind when liberated from a sense of responsibility to society and to God.").
Of course, not all conservatives accept the communitarian vision. See, e.g.,J. Budziszewski,
The Problem With Communitarianism, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 1995, at 22.
131 On the communitarian streak in modem social conservativism, see Michael W. Mc-
Connell, The Counter-Revolution in Legal Thought, POL'v REv., Summer 1987, at 18. The
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The communitarian themes in the progressive critique also bear
a striking resemblance to the renewed social conservative interest in
virtue. Virtue expressly comprises a willingness to act against personal
interest, something Economic Man never does. Because Economic
Man is both an autonomous individual and a purely rational calcula-
tor, the model of human behavior it provides leaves conservatives un-
satisfied, precisely because it fails to account either for important
social intermediating institutions or for virtue.13 2
The communitarian movement holds an obvious attraction for
social conservatives. In their world view, intermediating institutions
such as churches, schools, and social clubs develop citizens holding a
shared set of values: virtue, trust, responsibility, and the like. Inculca-
tion of these values often runs afoul of the state-sanctioned cult of the
autonomous individual. Conservative communitarians deplore the
rise of this rights-based "culture which 'dignifies with high moral pur-
pose what often amounts to low private interests or desires."' 133 It is
ironic that the progressives represented in Progressive Corporate Law
should embrace a set of communitarian ideals in the economic sphere
that could easily lead to results in the social sphere they would pre-
sumably abhor.
On close examination, of course, the parallels between progres-
sive and conservative communitarianism break down. Despite some
superficial rhetorical similarities between the two camps, conservatives
and progressives embrace different, largely incompatible values.
Where Tories worry about virtue, progressives worry about self-actuali-
zation.'34 Where Tories worry about private property rights, progres-
sives worry about the impact of humans on the environment.13 5 As we
shall see, these differences come to a head in contrasting attitudes
towards the proper role of state, which is precisely why the main-
world view I have in mind here is exemplified, at its very highest level, by Russell Kirk's
critique of Locke:
Except for some references to "tacit consent" by later generations to the
social compact, Locke has nothing to say about the Christian view of society
as a bond between God and man, and among the dead, the living, and
those yet unborn. There is no warmth in Locke, and no sense of consecra-
tion. His social compact is a far cry from the words in Genesis, "I do set my
bow in the cloud, and it shall be a token of a covenant between me and the
earth." Utility, not love, is the motive of Locke's individualism. Locke's
isolated individual, a kind of social atom, has the possibility of life, of lib-
erty, of property. But what sort of life, and liberty for what?
KIRK, supra note 116, at 287.
132 Cf. KIRK, supra note 84, at 118-19 ("That same infatuation with 'rationalism' which
terribly damages communal existence also produces an unquestioning confidence in the
competitive market economy and leads to a heartless individualism . ..
133 George Weigel, Capitalism for Humans, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1995, at 34, 37.
134 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 87, at 283-84.
135 See, e.g., id. at 285.
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stream contractarian, not the progressive communitarian, turns out to
be the natural ally of the conservative contractarian.' 3 6
Here then is the essential conservative contractarian: one who
seeks to reconcile conservative principle and economic theory by du-
plicating Russell Kirk's ability."consistently to favor free markets, pri-
vate property, competition, and at the same time to champion
virtue." 137 That this path is not always easy, nor always generative of
clear answers, does not reduce its import to conservative
contractarianism.
1. Finding Statist Snakes in the Communitarian Grass
While the conservative contractarian does not deny the impor-
tance of trust between, say, worker and firm for the effective internal
functioning of corporations, he notes that trust arises from shared val-
ues. 138 Consider an almost wholly ignored bit of evidence from the
stakeholderism debate. As we have seen, progressive communitarians
focus extensively on'the role of trust in the employment relation-
ship.'3 9 Yet they fall to acknowledge evidence that worker participa-
tion in corporate decisionmaking is most effective in homogeneous
work forces. 140 This evidence is consistent with the work of economic
and political theorists who opine that trust is most likely to arise within
homogeneous groups. 141 If we may assume that most of Progressive
Corporate Law's authors share Lewis Solomon's apparent support for
the Left's diversity agenda,142 the progressive communitarian agenda
would seem to suffer from a serious internal weakness.
Even within a homogeneous group, of course, individual interests
are likely to be varied and in conflict. If nothing else, the basic eco-
136 See infra Part III.B.2.
137 William F. Campbell, An Economist's Tribute to Russell Kirk, INTERCOuEGIATE RExV,
Fall 1994, at 68, 69.
138 Lawrence Mitchell concedes that "trust may require shared values," without grap-
pling with the implications of the relationship between these two entities. Mitchell, supra
note 49, at 195.
139 See supra Part IIIA.
140 See Robert Drago, Share Schemes, Participatory Management and Work Norms, 23 Ra.
RADmCAL POL ECON. 55, 59 (1991).
141 For a theoretical demonstration that trust- and reputation-based systems of ex-
change can lead to a market being monopolized by a small group, "possibly sharing ethnic
identity," see Marcel Fafchamps, Market Emergence, Trust, and Reputation (Apr. 1996)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Donald McCloskey likewise notes that the
importance of trust to market exchange may explain why members of the same ethnic
group are able to deal so profitably with one another. Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue,
AM. ScHoiAR, Spring 1994, at 177, 183-84. J. Budziszewski argues that because the polity is
a community of communities a strategic mutual accommodation can be reached only by
those sub-communities whose value systems share some common ground. "For instance
Catholics, Orthodox, evangelical Protestants, and religious Jews might be able to reach
such an accommodation." Budziszewski, supra note 130, at 26.
142 Solomon, supra note 87, at 298-99 (appraising Ben &Jerry's diversity).
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nomic principle of scarcity suggests a certain amount of intragroup
competition for scarce resources. These conflicts are inevitably more
pronounced in the absence of familial or tribal ties. If contractarians
fail to give due weight to the value of trust, perhaps it is because
progressives have failed to offer a plausible account of why a corpora-
tion's various constituencies should trust one another.143 Put another
way, trust is a virtue with significant social benefits. Most people prob-
ably benefit from behaving in a trustworthy manner most of the time,
which means trust also has considerable survival value. Precisely be-
cause trust is a virtue, however, the question arises: Can we assume
virtuous behavior on the part of the unwashed masses of a secular
society?
According to Donald McCloskey, "It is usual to praise a pagan or
a Christian virtue and then to complain how much we modems lack it.
Shamefully we bourgeois are neither saints nor heroes. The age is
one of mere iron-or aluminum, or plastic-not pagan gold or Chris-
tian silver." 144 No realistic social order can assume "heroic or even
consistently virtuous behavior" by its citizens. 145 All men have
sinned. 146 Everybody puts self-interest ahead of altruism some of the
time. Hence; trust is a commodity that is not easily bought. Or, as
Ronald Reagan famously opined, "trust, but verify."
A realistic social order must be designed around principles that
fall short of ideal virtues. 147 Effective legal rules and reliable predic-
tions about human behavior must be based upon the fallen state of
human beings, which is precisely what economic analysis does and
progressive communitarianism fails to do. Communitarianism de-
mands a standard of behavior that most members of an unredeemed
society are unable or unwilling to meet most of the time.' 48 Hence it
is not surprising that failed communitarian utopias abound in world
history.149
The basic bone of contention between conservative and progres-
sive scholars thus remains the old problem of the perfectibility of
human nature.150 Conservatives blame human misery on causes
143 Progressive communitarians resemble the political type Romano defines as "or-
ganicists," who avoid the problem described here bysimply denying the possibility of either
intra- or even inter-group conflict. Romano, supra note 83, at 931-32. We shall see that this
approach requires some rather unrealistic assumptions about human nature. See infra Part
III.B.2.b.
144 McCloskey, supra note 141, at 178.
145 NoVAK, supra note 68, at 28.
146 See Romans 5:12.
147 See NovAi, supra note 68, at 28.
148 See POSNER, supra note 61, at 416.
149 See id.
150 David Millon elsewhere offered a different take on the root issue that divides con-
tractarians and communitarians. Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, supra note 22, at
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which lurk naturally within the souls of men: pride, vanity, jealousy,
greed, and insatiable or unruly desires. Conservatives are skeptical
about the prospect of human perfectibility and suspicious of utopian
projects, mostly because they must be "conducted by imperfect...
human beings, [who are] always dangerously unfit to remake the
world."' 51 In contrast, progressives "believe that education, positive
legislation, and alteration of environment can produce men like gods;
they deny that humanity has a natural proclivity toward violence and
sin."152
If we conservatives are right, the progressive communitarian
agenda for corporate law cannot be attained without invoking the
state's monopoly on coercive force. As we shall see, many of Progressive
Corporate Law's authors propose defining a set of honorable or trust-
worthy conduct to which corporate actors will be expected to adhere.
Who would get to define the standard of conduct? What should we
do about inevitable breaches of that standard? The answers to these
questions reveal the essentially statist nature of the progressive agenda
in Progressive Corporate Law. Because this is a serious charge, let us con-
sider the evidence author by author.
According to David Millon, communitarians posit that corpora-
tions have obligations to employees and other nonshareholder con-
stituencies that extend beyond mere contractual obligation. 1 -53 By
taking this position, Millon's communitarians must be willing to use
the state's coercive power to enforce such obligations against noncon-
senting shareholders and their managerial representatives. Indeed,
Millon acknowledges that communitarians "would be eager to enter-
tain arguments for law reform aimed at addressing bargaining out-
comes that are substantively unfair."'154 In other words, they are
willing to use the state's judicial arm to rework voluntary arrange-
ments created through bargains that they find to be oppressive.
William Bratton cogently anticipates the argument that trust is a
fragile commodity, which leads inexorably to the need for a "coercive
backstop."'155 Or, as Bratton explains, "Doubts about the prevalence
125-26. Millon identifies two models of human nature: Economic Man and the trusting
soul of the communitarian vision. According to Millon, the debate between communitari-
ans and contractarians is not amenable to resolution because both models are grounded in
reality. Id. Although I concur with Millon that the debate is unlikely to be resolved, I
assert that the proper debate is not between Economic and Communitarian man, but be-
tween the liberal and conservative perspectives on the perfectibility of human nature.
151 Leon R. Kass, Farmers, Founders, and Fratricide: The Story of Cain and Abel, Fisr
THINGs, Apr. 1996, at 19.
152 Knio, supra note 11, at 10.
153 Millon, supra note 21, at 7-9.
154 Id. at 9; see also id. at 11 ("[a]dditional legal structures must reinforce and supple-
ment whatever gains people can achieve through contract.").
155 Bratton, supra note 11, at 165.
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of honor in the population can be mitigated by a backstop regime of
legal protection that enforces honor." 56 In effect, Bratton proposes
empowering the state to define what constitutes honorable behavior,
and bringing the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force to bear
on those who deviate from the state-imposed code.157
Lawrence Mitchell unabashedly asserts that "[a] t this point in our
history, the dominant institution is the state,"' 58 thereby relegating to
insignificance the host of intermediary institutions that protect indi-
vidual liberty against state encroachment. This does not seem to
trouble Mitchell, so long as the state uses its monopoly on coercive
force to achieve the chosen progressive ends of trust and community.
According to Mitchell, the state currently privileges individual auton-
omy over "the values of community built upon the foundation of
trust."1 59 But what is the alternative? Authoritarian enforcement of
community values? Apparently so, for Mitchell, acknowledging the
vulnerability of trust to self-interest, proposes legal changes designed
to reinforce trust. 60 Despite his disclaimers of loyalty to liberal princi-
ples,' 6' Mitchell's position is inevitably statist. As does Bratton, Mitch-
ell essentially proposes to define a code of conduct deemed
trustworthy and to empower the state to require adherence to that
standard.
Marleen O'Connor expects firms to recognize that "employee
participation in workplace governance is valuable because it achieves
human values by enhancing worker dignity.' 62 As such, her argu-
ment resembles "New Left visions of participatory democracy, in
which, as the critical legal scholar Karl Klare has put it, 'the struggle
[is] to make the workplace a realm of free self-activity and expres-
sion." 163 Despite its democratic rhetoric, this view of worker empow-
erment contains within it the seeds of statism. Consider O'Connor's
proposal to use fiduciary law's "socializing power to promote and rein-
force trust and honesty in business transactions."' 64 As is the case with
156 Id. at 160.
157 In correspondence, Bratton has expressed pragmatic political views that reject the
statist extremes of the progressive and communitarian ideals. He nevertheless continues
to embrace a relatively active role for the state in regulating the behavior of corporate
officers and directors. Bratton's April 12th letter, supra note 77.
158 Mitchell, supra note 49, at 185.
159 Id. at 186.
160 Id. at 204-05.
161 Id. at 205.
162 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 234.
163 David Brody, Workplace Contractualism in Comparative Perspective, in INDUSTRIAL DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 176, 177 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell
John Harris eds., 1993) (quoting Karl E. Klare,fudicialDeradicalization of the WagnerAct and
the Origins of Modem Legal Conscioauss, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 338-39 (1978)).
164 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 232.
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Bratton and Mitchell, O'Connor wants the state to define an accepta-
ble code of corporate conduct and enforce obedience thereto.
To be fair, one cannot charge these modern progressives with
precisely the same statist faults associated with the old Left. Instead of
nationalization, the stakeholderists among them advocate regulation
designed to protect nonshareholder constituencies and, in particular,
to encourage their participation in corporate governance. But the dif-
ference is only in degree, not in kind. Instead of the state directly
regulating corporate decisionmaking, as old-time leftists urged, these
progressives seek to provide state-sponsored constituency groups
(such as labor unions or environmentalists) the power to exercise
some yet to be defined degree of control over corporate decisions.
The stakeholderists thus bring to mind Richard Epstein's observa-
tion that the Left no longer advocates direct government ownership
of production. Instead, it operates on two different levels:
At a personal level, [modem socialism] speaks to the alienation
of the individual, stressing the need for caring and sharing and the
politics of meaning. At a regulatory level, it seeks to identify specific
sectors in which there is market failure and then to subject them to
various forms of government regulation.1 65
This is an especially apt description of Lewis Solomon's article.
Solomon identifies a hierarchy of five sets of human needs, the high-
est of which is self-actualization. 166 "Moving from the premise that the
development of human potential constitutes a key societal goal,
humanomics looks to the restructuring of economic and political in-
stitutions to attain maximum human growth, autonomy, and partici-
pation."1 67 Is this not precisely what Epstein describes as the first level
of modern socialism?
Solomon's essay also forcefully illustrates Michael Novak's predic-
tion that environmentalism may well replace socialism as the principal
opponent of democratic capitalism.1 68 According to Solomon,
human development and ecological preservation are linked: "Huma-
nomics as a political economy model may rest on a less affluent global
lifestyle and more self-sufficient patterns of local production and
consumption." 169
165 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLEs FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 23 (1995).
166 Solomon, supra note 87, at 283.
167 Id. at 284.
168 MICHAEL NovAI, THE SPmrr OF DEMOCRATIC CAPrAuSM 435-36 (2d ed. 1991).
169 Solomon, supra note 87, at 285. The irony, which is almost (but not quite) lost on
Soloion, is that his two chosen models for the Humanomics firm are producers of luxury,
high-cost consumer non-durables, namely, Ben & Jerry's (gourmet ice cream) and the
Body Shop (cosmetics). Id. This illustrates Novak's observation that "antipathy to capital-
ism" is highest among certain elites: "aristocrats, clergy, scholars, artists, and of course
government officials." NovAic, supra note 168, at 434-35. Some of those listed are precisely
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Stakeholderism is in some respects even more invidious than
traditional socialism. Instead of economic power being exercised di-
rectly by the central government, state control would be dispersed
throughout the economy.170 This amounts to "the nationalization of
people instead of companies, as individuals are subsumed by their of-
ficially designated communities." 171
2. Ordered Liberty and Corporate Law
David Millon charges that "[b]ecause the corporate law con-
tractarians offer nothing more than vaguely articulated libertarianism
as the basis for their insistence on the primacy of contract in defining
all intracorporate relationships, corporate law communitarians find
the contractarians' normative agenda to be morally deficient, and
quite obviously so."'172 I do not propose to rehash at great length the
arguments against the statism that pervades the progressive communi-
tarian agenda for corporate law, but a brief response to Millon's criti-
cism seems both appropriate and necessary. The great difficulty with
the progressive variant of communitarianism is that, if taken to its ex-
treme, it views individuals as little more than cells of a larger organ-
ism. Just as doctors kill cells to prevent cancer from spreading,
communitarianism readily justifies state intrusion into the private
sphere in the name of some communal good. 173 As I explain below,
this is precisely why conservatives have always balanced the communi-
tarian elements of conservative philosophy with a strong commitment
to ordered liberty. For conservative contractarians, the state's role is
limited to that of a facilitator of private gain-seeking through provi-
sion of default rules. Hence, conservatives reject the progressive claim
that the corporation is a creature of the state subject to regulation in
the "public interest."
a. On Being Anti-Statist Without Being Anti-Community
It may be argued that I overstate the statist elements of progres-
sive communitarian thought. After all, it may be said, law by defini-
tion sets a standard that is enforced by the state. Yet this objection
the sort of folks who have both the wealth to consume such products and the liberal bent
to buy them from "socially responsible" companies.
170 Cf Rich Lowry, Staking out the Center, NAT'L RE,., May 6, 1996, at 21, 22 (making a
similar point with respect to Labour Party stakeholderism).
171 Id. The links between stakeholderism and socialism should not be surprising, as
the intellectual roots of stakeholderism can be found in Christian socialism. See id. at 21.
172 Millon, supra note 21, at 7. William Bratton treats the ethical presuppositions of
law and economics contractarianism with greater respect, acknowledging its anti-statist
roots. Bratton, supra note 11, at 152.
173 Ironically, the same is true of strict adherence to law and economics's wealth max-
imization norm. See POSNER, supra note 61, at 376-77.
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simply illustrates the extent to which the nanny state has lulled us into
allowing state mandates to displace private ordering.' 74
The difference between conservative and progressive com-
munitarians is captured by the distinction between virtue and princi-
ple ethics. 175 Principle ethics are practiced by those who tend to
propose rules as solutions to problems. In a principle-dominated ethi-
cal system, leading a moral life consists mainly of complying with soci-
ety's mandated code of conduct. In contrast, virtue ethics reject codes
of conduct in favor of context-based individual judgment. In a virtue-
based ethical system, leading a moral life consists mainly of the habit-
ual private exercise of truthfulness, courage, justice, mercy, and the
other virtues.
Principle ethics seem especially attractive to progressive com-
munitarians, who cannot envision a society in which trust and other
virtues are solely a matter of private morality. Recall Professor Mitch-
ell's preference for "a society emphasizing cooperation and cohesion"
over "one that breeds conflict and enmity.' 76 Why assume that these
are the only conceivable states of society? Can we not imagine a soci-
ety free of enmity or conflict, but which also values freedom from co-
hesion enforced by positive law? Can we not imagine a society of
rugged individualists in which conflict is precluded by wary mutual
respect? In other words, can we not imagine a society that resembles
the American West (or, perhaps more accurately, John Ford's vision
thereof)? Even if Mitchell's two alternatives are the only possible
states of society, why must we assume that state-coerced cooperation
and cohesion is preferable to the risk of conflict that comes from leav-
ing morality to private virtues?
Principle ethics pose a double threat to ordered liberty, as they
displace not only private ordering of economic relationships, but per-
sonal virtue as well. In principle-based ethical systems, individuals are
not allowed to define for themselves what constitutes trustworthy or
honorable behavior, but instead must comply with judges' and/or bu-
reaucrats' definitions of honor.177
174 Timely reactions to this phenomenon abound in both the academic and, more
importantly, popular literature. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 165; PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How LAW is SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994).
175 For a brief but useful introduction to these concepts, see Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
Lauyers and Varues, 71 NOTRE DAME L. RE-v. 707 (1996) (book review).
176 Mitchell, supra note 49, at 199.
177 Principle ethics create an inescapable dissonance between the progressive com-
munitarians' description of trust and their law reform proposals. For example, Marleen
O'Connor claims that trust is contextual. O'Connor, supra note 66, at 223. If so, the ways
in which trust evolves and the resulting conduct norms are likely to vary from person to
person and from firm to firm. As such, a one-size-fits-all state-sanctioned code of behavior
cannot fit everyone and may not fit anyone. George Bernard Shaw's take on the Golden
Rule seems apt: "Do not do unto others as you would have them do unto you. They may
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Conservative contractarians claim it is possible to embrace com-
munitarian values without having to embrace the statist baggage pro-
gressive communitarianism brings with it. American culture once
partook of a dynamic interaction between individualistic and commu-
nitarian tendencies that produced a rich associational life. 178 If
America is becoming a low virtue society, as conservatives believe, 179 it
is precisely because of the sort of statism the stakeholderists propose
to foist upon us in the name of trust. Indeed, it can be argued that
the decline in social trust began when the rich set of mediating institu-
tions famously praised by Tocqueville was caught, like the Romans at
Cannae, between the nanny state on one side andjudicial hijacking of
the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force to advance a hyper-
legalistic cult of the autonomous individual on the other.180 Conserv-
atives reject both prongs of modem liberalism in favor of achieving
communitarian goals through private ordering. The conservative pes-
simism about human nature thus does not lead to statism, but instead
to promoting intermediating institutions that build "a citizenry regu-
lating itself from within according to a shared public 'language of
good and evil.""' 181
Conservatives believe that religious communities are critical to
the creation of such a virtuous citizenry. Virtue is an adaptive re-
sponse to the instinctive human recognition of, and need for, a tran-
scendent moral order codified in a body of natural law. 182 People are
most likely to act virtuously when they believe in an external power,
higher and more permanent than the state, who is aware of their
shortcomings and will punish them in the next life even if they escape
retribution in this life. 183
Civic virtue is also created by secular communities. As James Q.
Wilson observes, "[S]omething in us makes it all but impossible to
justify our acts as mere self-interest whenever those acts are seen by
others as violating a moral principle."184 Rather, "[w]e want our ac-
tions to be seen by others-and by ourselves-as arising out of appro-
have different tastes." KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 24 (1974) (quot-
ing Shaw).
178 See Fukuyama, supra note 125, at 43; Weigel, supra note 133, at 36-37.
179 See, e.g., Fukuyama, supra note 125, at 43.
180 See, e.g., Peter L. Berger, Trusting Laws, Trusting Others, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1996, at
12, 12-13 (attributing decline of social trust to proliferation of laws); see also EPSTEIN, supra
note 165, at 323-25 (describing the tendency of the state to destroy voluntary
communities).
181 Weigel, supra note 133, at 37.
182 Belief in natural law promulgated by a transcendent moral order is a key tenet of
conservatism. See KIRK, supra note 11, at 8. For an analysis of the human instinct for faith,
see PAULJOHNSON, THE QUEST FOR GOD 6-17 (1996).
183 Cf Proverbs 1:7 ("The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge.").
184 Wilson, supra note 66, at 39.
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priate motives." 185 Voluntary communities strengthen this instinct in
two ways. First, they provide a network of reputational and other so-
cial sanctions that shape incentives. Virtuous communities will rely
upon such sanctions to encourage virtue among their members. Sec-
ond, because people care more about how they are perceived by those
close to them, communal life provides a cloud of witnesses about
whom we care and whose good opinion we value, thus encouraging us
to strive to comport ourselves in accordance with communal norms.' 8 6
The nanny state is a poor substitute, at best, for the virtue-incul-
cating power of faith and voluntary community. We may fear the face-
less bureaucrat, but he does not inspire us to virtue. Conduct rising
above the lowest common moral denominator cannot be created by
state action. But while the state cannot make its citizens virtuous, it
can destroy the intermediary institutions that do inculcate virtue:
"Communities can be destroyed from without; but they cannot be cre-
ated from without; they must be built from within."'18 7
I am not arguing for a libertarian utopia in which the state has no
role in regulating corporate governance. Contractarian scholars en-
dorse the state's role in providing necessary and appropriate default
rules.' As Edmund Burke once observed, moreover, there is "a limit
at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue."'18 9 At that limit, the state
properly steps in.
The differences in attitude about state regulation between con-
tractarians and progressives thus are more accurately characterized as
ones of degree, not of kind. Yet, they are nonetheless critical. As we
have seen, progressive communitarians favor an activist role for the
state in enforcing mandatory codes of honorable or trustworthy con-
duct.190 The stakeholderists among them favor a drastic expansion of
corporate law's regulatory jurisdiction to encompass mandatory rules
governing the relationships between the corporation and its various
nonshareholder constituencies. Conservative contractarians simply
argue for a far less ambitious state role.
185 Id.
186 Cf. Hebrews 12:1 ("Therefore since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of
witnesses, let us throw off everything that hinders and the sin that so easily entangles, and
let us run with perseverance the race marked out for us.").
187 EPSTEIN, supra note 165, at 324.
188 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading under the Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers, 19J. CORP. L. 1, 86-39 (1993) (arguing for a mandatory rule against insider
trading by lawyers, while conceding that it is a close issue).
189 EDMUND BURKE, Observations on a Late Publication, intituled "THE PRESENT STATE OF
THE NATION" (1769), reprinted in 1 BURKE'S WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 271, 273 (London,
John C. Nimmo 1899).
190 According to Judge Posner, "[C)ommunitarians want an activist state that will pro-
mote social solidarity, whether directly or by inculcating qualities (of altruism, civic virtue,
or whatever) conducive to people's pulling together rather than pursuing selfish or nar-
rowly familial goals." POSNER, supra note 61, at 414.
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It is difficult to imagine a state-sanctioned honor code that both
rises above the lowest common moral denominator and can be main-
tained without an oppressively high level of state coercion. Assume
arguendo the validity of the communitarian claim that law has a so-
cializing effect,191 such that a legal regime designed to promote mu-
tual interdependence and trust actually causes people to behave more
virtuously. As the number of honorable and trustworthy people rises,
the gains from cheating also rise.192 If most people are trustworthy
most of the time, transactions will be premised on trust, which makes
dishonorable behavior profitable precisely because it permits the dis-
honest to take advantage of their naively trusting business associates.
Accordingly, the state must step in to provide Bratton's "coercive
backstop."' 93
This point is illustrated by Marleen O'Connor's discussion of
Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp.'94 In that case,
General Motors reneged on certain commitments made to a town in
which one of its plants had been located. O'Connor approvingly cites
the lower court's statement that "'[m]y conscience will not allow this
injustice to happen."' 95 By doing so, this judicial agent of the state
tried to impose his personal definition of trust and honor on a volun-
tary arrangement, invoking the state's monopoly on the use of coer-
cive force to mandate compliance by others with his personal code of
ethics. He made no serious effort to link his conscience with moral
norms having demonstrably substantial support in the community, as
our common law system requires, 196 or to wrestle with the very serious
policy concerns his action raises.
191 The argument that law has a socializing effect is advanced in Progresive Corporate
Law by both Lawrence Mitchell, supra note 49, at 203, and Marleen O'Connor, supra note
66, at 233-34, who essentially claim that people will learn to behave in trustworthy ways if
fiduciary law expects it of them. The rhetoric of fiduciary duty cases has the rather obvious
economic effect of deterring cheating, see MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORA-
TION LAw 578-79 (1995), and, of course, those cases "are actually concerned with conduct
that falls far short of a standard of selflessness," id. at 579. But even setting those objec-
tions aside, one may still doubt whether law has the socializing force O'Connor and Mitch-
ell ascribe to it. Their argument rests on the flawed progressive premise of human
perfectibility. Experience teaches that judge-made law has a very limited power to effect
social change. See generally GERAL) N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE (1991) (examining when and how American courts have attempted
to effect social change).
192 See POSNER, supra note 61, at 417.
193 Bratton, supra note 11, at 165.
194 Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CE, 1993 WL
132385 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev'd, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
195 O'Connor, supra note 66, at 229.
196 For a defense of that proposition, see MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE
COMMON LAW 15 (1988).
[Vol. 82:856894
COMMUNITY AMD STATISM
My opposition to this sort of lawmaking is premised on the princi-
ple of sphere sovereignty.1 97 Social institutions-including both the
state and the corporation-are organized horizontally, none
subordinated to the others, each having a sphere of authority gov-
erned by its own ordering principles. Expansion of any social institu-
tion beyond its proper sphere necessarily results in social disorder and
opens the door to tyranny. The trouble with the state thus is not its
existence, but its expansion beyond those functions prescribed by cus-
tom and convention, which were legitimized by ancient usage, into
the pervasive nanny state perpetually grasping at new aspects of social
life to drag into its slavering maw.
From a perspective founded on sphere sovereignty, the progres-
sive project's basic flaw is its willingness to invoke the coercive power
of the state in ways that deny the rights of mankind acting individu-
ally, or collectively through voluntary associations, to order society.
Although the conservative contractarian is unwilling to sacrifice virtue
at the altar of efficiency, he is equally unwilling to sacrifice ordered
liberty at the altar of community.198 A conservative properly insists
that individuals be left free to define for themselves what conduct
shall be deemed trustworthy or honorable, rather than being forced
to comply with, say, Professor Mitchell's code of ethics. Liberty is best
preserved if the state's monopoly on the use of coercive force is in-
voked only rarely and, as a general rule, only to deal with serious
moral questions. Otherwise, the state should confine itself to creating
a public square where the virtuous can act honorably, while keeping a
wary eye on the rest of society. This is precisely what the contractarian
197 Sphere sovereignty is a staple of Protestant social thought. SeeJ. Budziszewski, The
Problem with Conservatism, FiRsr THINGS, Apr. 1996, at 38, 42. Sphere sovereignty posits that
society consists of multiple entities-such as the state, churches, families, and corpora-
tions-each having a distinct identity. It stipulates that these entities do not derive their
respective rights and powers from one another, but rather each has its own internal well-
spring of authority. Sphere sovereignty further asserts that each social entity has its own
function. Although each entity must confine its activities to the sphere demarcated by its
social function, each entity is sovereign within that sphere. See generallyJohan D. van der
Vyver, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 321, 342-55 (1991) (discussing sphere sovereignty). By its very nature, sphere sover-
eignty thus assumes a limited state. In particular, the state has no right to interfere with
the internal governance of social entities outside its sovereign sphere, such as churches
and corporations. See id. at 352.
The Catholic principle of subsidiarity leads to similar results. Unlike sphere sover-
eignty's horizontal ordering of society, subsidiarity orders society vertically, with the state
above "lesser" institutions, such as the corporation. The state nevertheless transgresses its
moral authority when it absorbs or takes away the legitimate authority of lower institutions.
See Budziszewski, supra, at 42; see also Budziszewski, supra note 130, at 24 ("[Siubsidiarity is
pro-community, but anti-collectivist.").
198 Put another way, the conservative contractarian believes that the problem in both
the economic and the social sphere is not too little state interference, but too much. Cf
Weigel, supra note 133, at 36 ("[A]nti-statism is not the same thing as anti-
communitarianism.").
1997]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
approach to corporate law promotes: a state that regulates corporate
governance largely by providing default rules subject to contractual
opt-outs. 199
b. The Corporation v. Leviathan
The preceding Part focused on the relationship between statism
and virtue in rather general terms. Let us now turn our attention to
the specific: how does state regulation of corporate governance affect
the social institutions that inculcate virtue in free citizens? This ques-
tion decomposes into two subsidiary issues. First, is the corporation
itself an intermediary institution with virtue-inculcating functions?
Second, if the corporation itself does not inculcate virtue, can the cor-
poration help protect other voluntary communities that do fulfill that
function?
We have seen that it is difficult to describe the large public corpo-
ration as a community of shared values. Such corporations in fact re-
semble the nanny state-a large, impersonal bureaucracy with the
power to terrorize, but no ability to nurture. Yet, even so, the corpora-
tion may harbor within it sub-groups that amount to communities of
shared values. Granted, a corporation's shareholders, creditors, and
customers almost by definition cannot form communities. The host
of familiar collective action problems that prevent shareholders from
participating in corporate decisionmaking, for example, precludes
them from developing any sense of community. Instead, true commu-
nities are most likely to arise among those who work for the
corporation:
In the economic sphere today sociality seems far more prevalent
than individualism. In democratic capitalist nations various social
organisms, including the business enterprise and the corporation,
have replaced or supplemented old loyalties to family and clan.
Some persons today are closer to their colleagues in the workplace
than to their family. 200
One's co-workers thus provide precisely the cloud of witnesses so es-
sential to the inculcation of civic virtue.20'
199 Millon observes: "For the mainstream contractarians, private ordering through
contract is presumptively legitimate because it best serves their efficiency objective." Mil-
Ion, supra note 21, at 22-23. For conservative contractarians, this is precisely backwards: we
regard efficiency as a presumptively legitimate norm precisely because it best serves our
preference for private ordering through contract.
200 NovAK, supra note 68, at 29.
201 Indeed, one might even argue that communities existing within the corporation
help promote religious virtue: "For many millions of religious persons the daily milieu in
which they work out their salvation is the communal, corporate world of the workplace."
Id. at 47.
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To concede the existence of workplace communities, of course,
does not necessitate that we accept the progressive argument for legal
change designed to promote a utopian vision of industrial relations.
To the contrary, if the corporation harbors within it communities that
inculcate virtue in the firm's workers, then any state interference with
the corporation's internal governance that tends to interfere with
these communities' virtue-instilling functions becomes indistinguish-
able from, and no less tolerable than, state interference with any other
virtue-inculcating institution. 202
Let us assume, however, that the modem public corporation has
no power whatsoever to inculcate virtue in those who are employed by
it. Even so, minimizing state regulation of corporate governance is
essential to the preservation of a free, yet virtuous society. Viewed
from a sphere sovereignty perspective, subordination of economic in-
stitutions to the state poses a grave threat to personal liberty.203 Soci-
ety includes a host of communities with the potential to inculcate
virtue and other communal values: churches, schools, fraternal orga-
nizations, and the like. Although it may be unrealistic to think of a
large multinational corporation as constituting such a community, it is
perfectly plausible to think of the corporation as an intermediary insti-
tution standing between the individual and Leviathan.20 4 In other
words, although the development of virtuous citizens is arguably best
performed by smaller institutions with roots in the local community,
the corporation can still act as a vital countervailing force against the
state. Resistance to expanding the realm of mandatory corporate law
rules thus responds to the "notion that the prevailing moral threat in
our era may not be the power of the corporations but the growing
power and irresponsibility of the state." 20 5
202 It is certainly true that corporations themselves can take actions that destroy their
internal communities, as Deborah DeMott's review of Progressive Corporate Law illustrates in
her discussion of the downsizing phenomenon. DeMott, supra note 13, at 1319-21. But
Leviathan has truly triumphed if the state may do what it will with every voluntary commu-
nity that fails to live up to some bureaucrat's idea of proper communal norms. In other
words, DeMott errs in suggesting that contractarians "might well argue that legal interven-
tion is unnecessary because managers have an incentive not to downsize unwisely." Id. at
1326. Even assuming the incentive argument to be demonstrably false, the conservative
contractarian still opposes legal intervention in order to preserve economic liberty for its
own sake.
Moreover, even if we concede that downsizing is a sufficiently serious departure from
a moral norm sufficiently well-accepted tojustify legal intervention, we need not conclude
that corporate law provides an appropriate vehicle for state action. Changes in general
welfare laws, such as plant-closing legislation, are a demonstrably better solution to the
downsizing problem than are changes in internal corporate governance. See Bainbridge,
supra note 33, at 1431-45.
203 See, e.g., NovA, supra note 68, at 32-34.
204 See, e.g., id. at 3-4.
205 Id. at 34.
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Sphere sovereignty assumes that a limited state is an essential at-
tribute of ordered liberty. In a society premised on sphere sover-
eignty, private property and freedom of contract are thus important
not just in their own rights, but rather because they provide essential
limitations on the power of the state. 20 6 As Russell Kirk observed, con-
servatives are persuaded that "freedom and property are closely
linked: separate property from private possession, and Leviathan be-
comes master of all. '20 7 In the present context, we must amend this
sentiment to encompass freedom of contract, but the point remains
intact.
As a societal decisionmaking norm, the economic freedom to
pursue wealth does more than just expand the economic pie. A legal
system that pursues wealth maximization necessarily allows individuals
freedom to pursue the accumulation of wealth. Economic liberty, in
turn, is a necessary concomitant of personal liberty; the two have al-
most always marched hand-in-hand.20 8 Moreover, the pursuit of
wealth has been a major factor in destroying arbitrary class distinc-
tions by enhancing personal and social mobility.2 0 9 At the same time,
the manifest failure of socialist systems to deliver reasonable standards
of living has undermined their viability as an alternative to democratic
capitalist societies in which wealth maximization is a paramount socie-
tal goal.2 10 Accordingly, it seems fair to argue that the economic lib-
erty to pursue wealth is an effective means for achieving a variety of
moral ends.2 1 '
In turn, the modern public corporation has become a powerful
engine for focusing the efforts of individuals to maintain the requisite
sphere of economic liberty. Those whose livelihood depends on cor-
porate enterprise cannot be neutral about political systems. Only
democratic capitalist societies permit voluntary formation of private
corporations and maintain a sphere of economic liberty within which
they may function. This gives those who value such enterprises a pow-
erful incentive to resist both statism and socialism.2 12 Because tyranny
is far more likely to come from the public sector than the private,
those who for selfish reasons strive to maintain both a democratic cap-
206 See id. at 45.
207 KIRy, supra note 11, at 9.
208 See NOVAK, supra note 68, at 44-45.
209 See id. at 42.
210 Consider Michael Novak's observation that democratic-capitalist nations can feed
themselves, while socialist ones can't. Id. at 37. For an argument that wealth creation (if
not its maximization) is a moral imperative, see id. at 38.
211 Cf POSNER, supra note 61, at 382. DeBow and Lee cogently argue that the share-
holder wealth maximization norm promotes efficient resource allocation on a society-wide
basis, which they plausibly assert redounds to the benefit of consumers-the largest non-
shareholder constituency of them all. DeBow & Lee, supra note 116, at 416-18.
212 See NovA, supra note 68, at 57.
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italist society and, of particular relevance to the present argument, a
substantial sphere of economic liberty therein, serve the public inter-
est.2 13 As Michael Novak observes, private property and freedom of
contract were "indispensable if private business, corporations were to
come into existence."214 In turn, the corporation gives "liberty eco-
nomic substance over and against the state."215
c. A Public Choice Perspective
Even those not persuaded by the theoretical arguments against
the progressive communitarian agenda might find pause when push
comes to legislative shove. Progressive critics of neoclassical econom-
ics often fail to take into account the secondary unintended effects of
economic regulation. Because the secondary effects are often counter
to and larger than the primary intended effects, much social legisla-
tion makes matters worse, not better. This is so even if the public
choice arguments made below are discounted, because the law of un-
intended consequences inevitably follows from the bounded rational-
ity of human minds.
Although conservative contractarians value concepts of trust,
honor, and virtue, the pragmatists among us are highly dubious of the
legislative ability to promote such values. In our society, questions of
distributive justice have been taken out of the hands of individuals
and reserved for the government, in particular the legislative branch.
This is just as well, because judicial powers are poorly suited to redis-
tribution.21 6 In contrast, the judicial branch's powers are well-suited
to enforcing wealth-maximizing rules.217 Indeed, there is a considera-
ble body of literature supporting the proposition that the common
law has what Judge Posner calls an "implicit economic logic."218
Economic analysis of the legislative process, however, gives one a
disheartening perspective on legislative solutions to distributive
problems. Public choice is the branch of law and economics relevant
here. Public choice's basic tenet is that well-defined, politically influ-
ential interest groups use their power to obtain legal rules that benefit
themselves at the expense of larger, more diffuse groups.21 9 In other
213 See id. at 34.
214 Id. at 45.
215 Id.
216 See POSNER, supra note 61, at 388.
217 As Judge Posner argues, "[W]ealth maximization is an especially useful tool for
guiding common law adjudication." Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics Is Mora 24
VAL. U. L. REv. 163, 170 (1990).
218 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYsis OF LAW 251 (4th ed. 1992).
219 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23-24
(1991).
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words, legislative decisions are not driven by distributive justice, but by
interest group pressures.
I emphatically do not claim that all legislative choices are driven
solely by interest group pressures. Public choice theory has enormous
explanatory power, but it has difficulty accounting "for ideological
politicians like Reagan and Thatcher."220 Any sensible account of
modem politics must consider not only legislators' naked self-interest,
but also the possibility that ideology and morality matter to legislators
as well, even when their beliefs put them at odds with important inter-
est groups.
I am merely claiming that we need to be suspicious of legislators
who claim to be acting in the name of distributive justice. Ideology
and morality often serve as cover for self-interest. Worse yet, "human
nature may incline even one acting in subjective good faith to ration-
alize as right that which is merely personally beneficial."221 Before we
conclude that a nakedly contractarian outcome is socially undesirable,
let us be very careful to ensure that legislatively reversing that out-
come does not lead to an even more undesirable result.222
220 Id. at 24.
221 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988) (emphasis
omitted).
222 Gregory Mark postulates a tension between contractarianism and public choice
theory. One of the basic tenets of public choice is that cohesive and well-organized interest
groups engage in private rent-seeking through the legislative process. Mark applies this
principle to corporate law rules, positing that corporate constituencies with interest group
power will seek private gain through lobbying for specific default rules. Mark, supra note 6,
at 81-82. His point is valid, but the problem would be far worse if we embraced the com-
munitarian vision of corporate law.
Corporate constituencies seek rents either through changes in corporate law itself or
through changes in general welfare legislation. We might refer to these as "internal" and
"external" rent seeking, respectively. Under present law, internal rent seeking is hard to
disguise. Shareholder wealth maximization is still the dominant corporate governance
norm and, as such, provides a single yardstick against which private-regarding legislation
can be measured. See Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 1423-25. In contrast, many progressives
favor some sort of "multi-fiduciary" regime, in which the board of directors is responsible
to all corporate constituents. Under this model, it would be easier for special interest
groups to cut legislative deals, because private-centered legislation would be evaluated us-
ing multiple, vague standards. Indeed, the communitarian model invites special interest
legislative competition by getting corporate law into the business of regulating multiple
constituencies.
In any case, Mark's claim that the contractarian model is in tension with public choice
theory rests on a flawed understanding of the former. No sensible contractarian claims
that state laws are perfect default rules. To the contrary, the deleterious effects of interest
group rent-seeking is a major theme of the contractarian literature.
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C. A Reality Check: The Progressive Agenda v. Long-Term
Political Trends
I now turn to the pragmatic claim that the progressive agenda is
out of step with modem political reality.223 Although corporate social
responsibility remains a favorite issue of liberal political figures, such
as President Clinton and former Labor Secretary Robert Reich, one
can plausibly argue that the principal political constraint on free mar-
ket policies currently comes from populists like Pat Buchanan and
Ross Perot. As political commentator Bill Schneider has observed, the
United States has become "ideologically populist, and operationally
libertarian."224 Hardly the stuff of which progressive dreams are
made.225
Although the Perot and Buchanan phenomena provide strong ev-
idence for the continuing political vitality of antifinance populism,
this carries virtually no positive implications for the progressive
agenda. While public suspicion of business may be growing,
there is no sign yet that the bogey-man of 'big business' comes even
close to the monstrosity of 'big government' in the public imagina-
tion. A [recent] Gallup Poll ... found 64% of Americans saw big
government as the biggest threat to the future of the country, while
only 24% cited big business .... 226
This is not an attempt to prognosticate the 1998 elections; my point is
only that the long-term trends appear to work against statist solu-
223 DeBow and Lee offer a different, but equally pragmatic, argument against the stat-
ism of progressive corporate communitarianism:
[T]he communitarians come close to confusing the possibility of govern-
ment intervention through corporate law with its advisability.... Butjust
because government can make any demands it wishes of investors does not
mean that it should. Compliance with ambitious government edicts comes
at a price. At the limit, it involves a price that investors could simply refuse
to pay.
DeBow & Lee, supra note 116, at 423. They go on to explain that the relative ease with
which investors can exit from corporate investments that turn sour because government
regulation makes it hard for government to regulate corporations. Id.
224 John H. Fund, Editorial, Prrr. PosT-GAzEtrr, Oct. 23, 1994, at Fl.
225 David Millon appears to see the first flashes of political support for the progressive
agenda in the nonshareholder constituency statutes. Millon, supra note 21, at 11-12.
Lynne Dallas likewise believes that state adoptions of nonshareholder constituency statutes
reflects changing norms about shareholder wealth maximization. Dallas, supra note 21, at
54. Both ignore the statutes' well-known origins as special interest legislation designed to
protect corporate managers from hostile takeovers.
226 Alan Murray, Merger Wave May Put Spotlight on Antitrust, WALL ST.J., Apr. 8,1996, at
Al.
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tions.227 Progressive Corporate Law's authors thus are seriously out of
step with the zeitgeist.228
CONCLUSION
Progressive legal thought historically has contained two features
of present import. First, progressives believe that government regula-
tion allocates resources more fairly (and even more efficiently) than
do markets. Second, progressives reject populist democracy in favor
of bureaucratic direction. In the progressives' ideal world, public pol-
icy is set by government bureaucrats who are guided by academic ex-
perts in law, economics, and the social sciences. 229 Although they left
behind the modern nanny state as their legacy, the naive faith of early
progressives that the government could do a better job of allocating
resources than do markets withered in the face of the law and eco-
nomic analysis of the legislative process.230 However, a new genera-
tion of progressive scholars has arisen, like a shoot sprouting from a
seemingly dead trunk.The core issues of concern to this new generation are hardly orig-
inal. Just as sunspots come in cycles, so too does the corporate social
responsibility debate. In the 1930s, we had the Berle-Dodd debate.231
In the 1950s, Berle and others revisited the issue.232 In the 1970s,
227 Consider the observation that President Clinton captured the political initiative in
1995 "with a nimble two-step: embracing the cause of limiting government .... while
rejecting the specific GOP plan to get there as 'extreme.' In effect, Clinton installed him-
self with centrist voters as the legitimate defender of the center-right consensus ...."
Ronald Brownstein, As Democrats Unite, GOP Divides, Campaign is Breaking 40-Year Mold, L.A.
TmES, July 1, 1996, at A5.
228 DeBow and Lee cogently argue that the communitarian agenda for corporate law
cannot succeed for two reasons. First, state legislatures that adopt inefficient communitar-
ian laws will experience emigration of corporations to states with more efficient laws. De-
Bow & Lee, supra note 116, at 405-09. Their argument in this regard is a straightforward
and perfectly plausible adaptation of the race to the top hypothesis. Second, they contend
that a federal law of corporations emphasizing inefficient communitarian values would be
unavailing because entrepreneurs would move off-shore or to less-heavily regulated organi-
zational forms (such as LLCs). Id. at 409-15. This prong of their argument is a straightfor-
ward and perfectly plausible application of the triviality hypothesis. I find nothing to
quibble with in Debow and Lee's argument, but would add that 60-plus years of experience
with the dual federal-state regulatory scheme has taught us two things: (1) Congress is
exceedingly unlikely to adopt a federal law of corporations of any sort, communitarian or
otherwise; and (2) this is a very good thing as a matter of both economic efficiency and
federalism. SeeStephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws atProxy Contests, 1992
Wis. L. RFv. 1071, 1138-43.
229 See Hovenkamp, supra note 65, at 149.
230 See id. at 157-58.
231 Compare Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049
(1931), and Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L REv. 1365
(1932), with Merrick Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicab,le 2 U. C-L L. RFv. 194 (1935).
232 See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
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there was a major fracas over corporate social responsibility.23 3 Fi-
nally, today we have the nonshareholder constituency debate. The
twenty-year spacing is particularly interesting, because it accounts for
just about one academic generation. Each generation of new scholars
seems compelled to rehash the same set of problems. To be sure,
each iteration adopts a new terminology, focuses on a slightly differ-
ent facet of the problem, and develops some new ideas. But, all-in-all,
we have been here before.2M The central issue remains whether cor-
poration law is a species of public or private law. As an intellectual
matter, the debate is unlikely to ever be finally resolved. To the con-
trary, I can predict with confidence another outbreak sometime
around the year 2015.
This is not to suggest that the debate is bootless. George Weigel
wisely observes that both democracy and free markets are learned be-
haviors: "The institutions of a free polity and a free economy can in-
deed endure for generations-but only if the people become
democrats and democratic capitalists, over and over again."235 By
prompting us to relearn the lessons of the past, the stakeholderists
thus perhaps unwittingly promote a renewal of commitment to the
idea of free markets.
As far as this go-round is concerned, the progressive agenda is
unlikely to make much headway. First, it fails to offer legal deci-
sionmakers a model for predicting human behavior that seems capa-
ble of displacing those successfully employed by mainstream law and
economics scholars. Second, and far more importantly, its communi-
tarian elements or, more precisely, the means by which those ele-
ments are to be achieved, run counter to the spirit of a democratic
capitalist society. And even if the progressive notion that community
can be built through government edict were not outright erroneous, it
is at least out of step with the zeitgeist. We are hardly in the midst of a
233 See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TMEas, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32; see also Kenneth Davis, The Case for and against Business
Assumption of SocialResponsibilities, in MANAGING CORPORATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILnY 35, 40-44
(Archie B. Carroll ed., 1977).
234 I made this point in Bainbridge, supra note 33, at 1435 n.40. David Millon appears
to respond to my argument when he contends that the present generation of communitari-
ans are concerned with internal corporate relationships rather than with the corporation's
external relationship to society. "Critics therefore have missed an important difference
when they assert that communitarian arguments are merely a rehash of earlier corporate
social responsibility claims in the Dodd or Nader mode. In contrast to these perspectives,
the communitarian stance is inward-looking and domestic in its focus." Millon, Personif)ing
the Corporate Body, supra note 22, at 126. One need only note the substantial overlap be-
tween the issues on which modem communitarians concentrate and those that animated
prior iterations of the corporate social responsibility debate: the rights of nonshareholder
constituencies, worker protection and empowerment, environmental protection, and the
like, to see that the differences between old and new progressives are few.
235 Weigel, supra note 133, at 34.
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progressive era. Barring an unlikely political realignment, the pro-
gressive agenda is destined to remain a matter of solely academic
interest.
